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ABSTRACT

This report examines how the earnings of blacks are affected by their metropolitan
area's employment growth and mix of industries. I find that faster metropolitan area growth
has large positive effects on black earnings. Blacks tend to live in slow-growth metropolitan
areas (MS As); over the 1973-89 period, if blacks had lived in MS As with the same average
growth as whites, black earnings in 1989 would have been 5% higher than the actual black
earnings level in 1989. I also find that in MSAs that attract more "high wage premium
industries" industries that pay well relative to education requirements black earnings
increase faster than in the average MS A. A one percent increase in an MSA's "average
wage premium," due to shifts in the MSA's mix of industries, will increase black earnings
by over 6 percent, whereas white earnings will increase by around 2 percent.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report examines how the real earnings and poverty rate of blacks are affected by
their metropolitan area's employment growth and mix of industries. This report's findings
are relevant to two policy debates. First, the report provides evidence from metropolitan
labor markets on whether black poverty can be reduced by stronger labor demand. Some
poverty researchers have claimed that poverty in modern U.S. society is determined by
cultural and psychological forces, and is little affected by demand conditions. Second, the
report provides evidence on whether state and local economic development policies that
increase local job growth can help minorities and the poor. Some critics of state and local
economic development policies have claimed that the attraction of new jobs is more likely to
help in-migrants, local landowners, and highly skilled and educated local residents than the
poor and the unemployed.

Previous Research
Sixteen previous studies have examined how local labor market conditions in the U.S.
affect the economic fortunes of blacks. Fourteen studies find that stronger local labor markets
help blacks. Of the nine studies that compare effects on blacks to effects on whites, six find
that local labor market conditions have stronger effects on blacks.
Only eight studies have examined the effects of the mix of industries in a local
economy on blacks. Six of these studies find some effects of local industrial mix. But three
of these six studies have problems with their definition of industrial mix, defining industrial
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mix so that it must change if the local economy grows. There is certainly room for
additional research that will define "industrial mix" so that a local economy's industrial mix
and employment can change independently.

Methodology and Data of This Study
This study uses as dependent variables the year-to-year percentage change in a
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in average economic outcomes for different subgroups of
blacks and whites. The independent variables include year-to-year percentage changes in
various measures of the MSA's "economic development." The model is estimating pooling
data from up to 200 MSAs on percentage changes from 1973-74 to 1988-89. The empirical
model controls national time trends. The empirical results reflect how differences in an
MSA's economic development trends from the national average affect differences from the
national average in the economic fortunes of various groups.
The most important dependent variables in this study are the year-to-year percentage
change in the MSA's average real personal earnings for various groups, and the year-to-year
change in the MSA average poverty rate for various groups. The most important
independent variables in this study are the year-to-year percentage changes in the MSA's
total employment, and the year to year change in the MSA's average "industry wage
premium." An industry's wage premium is the percentage by which wages paid in the
industry exceed what one would expect based on the education, age, and other credentials of
the industry's workers. For example, many manufacturing industries, and a few service
industries such as the communications and utilities industries, pay well even though their

workers have relatively modest educations. The MSA's average industry wage premium is
the average wage one would expect to be paid in the MS A, if all industries followed national
wage patterns. The year-to-year change in the MSA's average industry wage premium
reflects how shifts in the MSA's industrial mix are affecting whether the MS A offers "good
jobs."

Results of the Empirical Analysis
I find that metropolitan employment growth has statistically significant and large
positive effects on the economic well-being of blacks. An increase of 10% in a metropolitan
area's total employment will increase blacks' average per capita real earnings by over 8%.
This increase of 8% in real earnings is mostly due to growth increasing the percentage of
weeks during the year that the average black is employed. The black poverty rate will
decline by about 4 points (e.g., from 30% poverty rate to 26%). These effects are larger
than the effects of MS A growth on whites. A 10% increase in MS A employment will
increase white per capita real earnings by about 5 %, and will reduce the white poverty rate
by less than 1 point. The difference in growth effects on black and white poverty is highly
statistically significant, whereas the difference in growth effects on black and white earnings
is marginally statistically significant.
The effects of metropolitan employment growth on blacks are large enough that the
regional pattern of growth can have significant effects on national trends in black and white
earnings. Blacks tend to live in slow-growth MSAs compared to whites. Suppose we
consider a hypothetical world in which blacks during the 1973-89 period had lived in MSAs
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whose average growth was the same as what prevailed for whites. This hypothetical world
could have been achieved either by increasing growth in MSAs with large black populations,
or helping blacks move to faster growing MSAs. In this hypothetical world, black real
earnings in 1989 would be expected to be 5% greater than they were in the real world.
I also find that increases in an MSA's average industrial wage premium has
statistically significant and large effects on average per capita black real earnings. A 1
percent increase in an MSA's average industry wage premium increases average black real
earnings by over 6 percent. This 1 percent increase in the MSA wage premium would only
increase white real earnings by around 2 percent. These greater effects on blacks appear to
be mainly due to greater effects of higher wage premium industries on black wages. A 1
percent increase in the average MSA wage premium increases black weekly earnings by over
6%, whereas white weekly earnings increase by around 1%. A natural interpretation of
these results is that "well-paying" industries tend to have narrower racial wage differentials.

Policy Implications
The report's findings suggest general directions for public policy but do not prove the
case for any specific policy program. Economic development policies that increase
metropolitan growth and attract high wage premium industries can provide important labor
market benefits for both white and black residents. But exactly which economic development
policies (tax abatements, technology development programs, general tax cuts, improvements
in local education, assistance to manufacturers for modernization and exporting, business
incubators, entrepreneurial training programs) work best to accomplish these goals is unclear.

xn

National policies that seek to provide blacks with more high wage jobs can make a
substantial difference in reducing black poverty and increasing black economic success. But
which such black labor demand policies (local economic development policies, helping blacks
migrate to healthier metropolitan economies, enterprise zones, public service jobs, wage
subsidies for private employment for disadvantaged workers) will be most effective in
helping blacks per dollar spent is unclear. The general policy direction of trying to increase
demand for black labor in local economies is sound. But much more policy experimentation
and research needs to be done to determine how best to improve the local economic climate
facing blacks.
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I.

Introduction

The causes of persistent poverty among blacks in American cities are much debated
today. Some researchers argue that the economic problems of blacks can be largely
explained by declining demand for less educated labor. Other researchers argue that poverty
has been increased by the decline of central city jobs. Still other researchers argue that job
availability is not the main problem and that persistent poverty must be explained by cultural
forces.
A more longstanding debate has focused on whether local economic development
programs can really help the unemployed and the poor. Some argue that any jobs these
programs create in a local area will not go to the resident poor but to in-migrants.
Contributing to both these debates, this report offers new empirical evidence on how
black economic status is affected by local demand. I find strong evidence that black
economic prospects are harmed by slow overall metropolitan employment growth. Blacks
are also harmed by a metropolitan area's loss of high wage premium industries industries
that pay well and have modest educational requirements. But black economic status is not
strongly affected by shifts in a metropolitan area's industrial mix towards industries with
stringent educational requirements.
These findings provide an argument for policies designed to increase the availability
of good jobs for blacks. Local economic development is one such policy, but others could
be considered, for example, public service jobs or wage subsidies for private jobs. Many
issues, such as cost per job created, should be analyzed before any "labor demand" antipoverty policy is endorsed. Furthermore, the potential benefits of a labor demand policy do
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not imply that we should ignore anti-poverty policies dealing with cultural, educational, or
family issues.

Increasing Income Inequality and Shifts in Labor Skill Demand and Supply
Rapid secular growth in the relative demand for "more-skilled" workers is a key
component of any consistent explanation for rising inequality and changes in the wage
structure over the last 25 years...Observed fluctuations in the rate of growth of the
relative supply of college graduates combined with smooth trend demand growth in
favor of more-educated workers can largely explain fluctuations in the college/high
school differentials over the 1963-1987 period. [Katz and Murphy (1992, p. 37)]
Recent economics studies analyze why earnings inequalities between more and less
educated individuals in the United States expanded enormously in the 1980s after declining in
the 1970s. These wage changes can be largely explained by assuming that demand for more
educated workers has grown steadily, but the supply of college educated workers stagnated in
the 1980s after expanding rapidly in the 1970s. (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and
Murphy, 1992). Because blacks' education levels on average are lower than whites',
declining wages for less educated workers may help explain declining black employment and
earnings. For example, Juhn (1992) estimates that the decline in wages for low-wage black
males explains half of the early 1970s to late 1980s decline in this group's labor force
participation.
One limitation of this literature is that it relies less on empirical evidence than on
assumptions. The research does not directly estimate how shifts in demand for educated
workers affect labor markets, but rather assumes a trend increase in demand for educated
workers and assumes how this trend will affect labor markets. As this report will show,
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metropolitan area data allows direct estimates of how shifts in skills demand affect local
labor markets.
These recent national studies are unable to use decreasing demand for less educated
persons to fully explain the economic problems of blacks. As noted above, Juhn finds that
half but only half of the decline in labor force participation of lower wage black males is
explained by declines in this group's wages. Bound and Freeman (1992) find that black high
school dropouts' employment rates have dropped relative to whites during the 1970s and
1980s. This decline appears inconsistent with observed changes in the relative supply and
demand of these groups.

The Spatial and Skills Mismatch View
The simultaneous, yet conflicting, transformations of the employment and
demographic bases of the cities contributed to a number of serious problems,
including a widening gap between the skill needs of urban job growth industries and
the skill levels of minority resident labor (with correspondingly high rates of localized
structural unemployment), greater distances separating inner-city blacks from
suburban areas of blue-collar job growth, and increasing levels of urban poverty.
[John Kasarda (1990, p. 314)]
Most of the inner-city poor appear able to find jobs, albeit not of the quality they
would like. The clamor of immigrants from all over the world to come to the United
States strongly suggests that opportunities for the unskilled are still abundant here.
To explain nonwork, I see no avoiding some appeal to psychology or culture."
[Lawrence Mead (1992, p. 12)]
Perhaps changes in U.S. skills demand can explain black economic problems if one
also considers changes in how jobs are spatially distributed. The spatial and skills mismatch
hypothesis, most prominently advocated by William Julius Wilson (1987) and John Kasarda
(1985, 1989, 1990), is that the decline of manufacturing jobs in cities has hurt black
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economic prospects by reducing the number of good jobs to which poor blacks have realistic
access, and thereby hurt black economic prospects. 1 Changes in the spatial distribution of
jobs may mean that the decline in demand for less educated black labor is worse than
assumed by economists relying on national data.
Kasarda has presented evidence that central cities in the North and Midwest have
suffered from extensive job loss and that the remaining jobs in central cities tend to require
more education than in the past. Because blacks are concentrated in central cities, on
average have lower skills, and face difficulties in getting access to suburban housing and
better education, it would appear that these shifts in labor demand must adversely affect
blacks.
But the labor market effects of labor demand shifts depend on the feasible labor
supply shifts of all workers, not just blacks. For example, if some jobs move to the suburbs,
there need be no effect on central city wages or employment prospects if a sufficient number
of workers can easily shift their residence or commuting patterns. Not all workers must
easily make these adjustments, just enough relative to the size of the demand shift to the
suburbs. With enough supply adjustment, both central city labor demand and supply will
decline equally, which need have no adverse labor market effects on central city blacks even
if housing discrimination excludes blacks from the suburbs. 2 Similarly, if some jobs become
more high skill, this need not affect the wages of unskilled workers. Unskilled wages can

1 Wilson and Kasarda's arguments of course have a number of antecedents. Some of their
ideas, for example, were anticipated in Bluestone and Harrison (1982), which discussed the
disproportionate effects of plant closings on blacks.
2 Mead (1992) makes this point (p. 100).
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remain unchanged if a sufficient supply of workers easily shifts from unskilled to skilled
jobs, either by acquiring skills or using previously untapped skills. The effects of shifting
labor demand can only be determined by empirical analysis, not economic theory.

Metropolitan Growth and Decentralization
Some discussions of the spatial-skills mismatch hypothesis fail to clearly distinguish
between trends in overall metropolitan employment growth and employment
decentralization. 3 A central city may experience slow employment growth because its
metropolitan area's employment growth is slow or because employment is shifting from the
central city to the suburbs, or because of some combination. These different types of shifts
in central city employment demand may have quite different effects. It is harder for labor
supply adjustments to offset shifts in labor demand from one metropolitan area to another
than shifts in labor demand within one metropolitan area. Adjustment to demand shifts from
one metropolitan area to another require migration across metropolitan areas, which involves
changing homes, activities, and friends. Demand shifts within a metropolitan area can be
accommodated by shifts in commuting patterns; residential shifts that do occur are for shorter
distances and are psychologically and financially easier.
This distinction between metropolitan growth trends and decentralization is important
because it affects the ease of using labor demand policies to attack poverty. Creating specific

3 As I will discuss below, some empirical tests of the spatial and skills mismatch
hypothesis also do not clearly distinguish between shifts in the industrial distribution of
demand within a metropolitan area, and shifts in the overall demand for labor in the
metropolitan area. See, for example, Eggers and Massey, 1992.
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types of jobs at specific locations is harder than creating jobs of any type somewhere within
the metropolitan area.
It may not be clear why differences across metropolitan areas in employment growth
would affect blacks more adversely than whites. But as this report will show, blacks are
concentrated in slower growing metropolitan areas compared to whites. Researchers tend to
assume that, because blacks are concentrated in the relatively fast-growing South, blacks
must on average benefit from differences in regional, state, and metropolitan area growth.
But many southern blacks are in nonmetropolitan areas or in relatively slow-growing
southern metropolitan areas, and northern blacks are concentrated in extremely slow growth
metropolitan areas.

The Capitalization Hypothesis
The target population, the unemployed labor force, is not always the only or even
the main beneficiary of new industry. A disproportionately large share of the
increased purchasing power goes to the owners of immobile resources other than
labor. Real estate owners, banks, retailers, and utilities are surer beneficiaries than
are the unemployed coal miners or loggers who are less likely to get the jobs in the
new plants than are new in-migrants, younger and with more appropriate skills.
[Louis Winnick (1966, p. 280)]
A well-known hypothesis in regional science is that local economic development
policies in the long run do not help the poor but are just "capitalized" into increased land
values. The argument for this capitalization hypothesis is that any labor market benefits
from a metropolitan area's job growth, such as higher wages or lower unemployment, will
keep on attracting in-migrants until wages and unemployment return to normal. But land and
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housing values will increase because the metropolitan area's population will be higher, and
local land supply is fixed.
The capitalization hypothesis would be of little policy relevance if this "long run"
were many years away. But American society has enough mobility that the long run might
arrive soon. For the average metropolitan area, with zero net migration, over 10 percent of
the original population will move out over a five-year period and be replaced by in-migrants
(Bartik, 1991, pp. 71, 79). Even a successful economic development policy is unlikely to
increase an area's employment, compared to what it otherwise would be, by more than 10
percent over a five-year period. Modest changes in normal in- and out-migration flows
would offset the increase in jobs due to a successful economic development policy.
Because of high U.S. mobility rates, some economists have argued that the labor
market effects of shocks to local labor demand disappear almost immediately. For example,
Stephen Marston argued that "shocks that disturb the steady-state relationship among the
unemployment rates of metropolitan areas tend to be eliminated by mobility within a year"
(Marston, 1985, p. 74).
If local demand shocks have such transitory effects, then local economic development
policies are doomed to fail to achieve their primary goals: reducing unemployment and
increasing the earnings of local residents. Furthermore, if Marston's argument is correct,
local labor markets would be a poor laboratory for examining the effects of labor demand
shifts. Effects of local demand shocks would dissipate too quickly to be observed.
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The Implications of Hysteresis Effects and Efficiency Wage Effects
But there are two arguments why local demand shocks may have long run effects.
The first argument is that local labor market equilibria may be subject to "hysteresis effects."
Hysteresis has long been used by physicists to describe a system whose equilibrium position
depends on its history. Hysteresis has recently been adopted by economists to describe a
labor market whose long run equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the past history of
unemployment in that market (Cross, 1988; Bartik, 1991).
The most plausible cause of hysteresis effects in a local labor market are the effects of
increased demand on local residents' human capital accumulation. For example, decreased
local employment may cause some local residents to become unemployed in the short-run.
Unemployed local residents may lose job skills and opportunities for on-the-job training;
their self-confidence may be reduced; finally, their unemployment experience may lead them
to be viewed as "damaged goods" by other employers. These events may cause the
employability and earnings of these local residents to be lower in the long run. These long
run effects may not be overcome even if these local residents move to another metropolitan
area.
A second argument is that changes in an area's industrial mix may lead to different
average "efficiency wage" premiums in the local area, and these premiums may be relatively
insensitive to migration (Bartik, 1990). Recent economic research suggests that industries in
the United States and elsewhere pay quite different wages, even when all observable worker
characteristics are controlled (Dickens and Katz, 1987; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz
and Summers, 1989). These industrial wage differentials are consistent across countries and
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persistent over time. Various theories have been offered for industry wage differentials, for
example, that they occur because employers want to keep worker productivity up by paying a
perceived "fair wage." Whatever the theory, these persistent industrial wage differences
imply that an area's average wages may be permanently lowered by the loss of "good jobs"
(jobs in industries paying well relative to workers' credentials), and permanently increased
by economic development efforts that attract "good jobs."

Outline of the Rest of This Report
Section II reviews previous research that has estimated how local economic conditions
affect blacks. Section III describes the methodology and data used for this report. Section
IV presents a preliminary analysis of trends in these data. Sections V, VI, and VII present
new estimates of how MS A growth, the local industrial mix, and MS A decentralization affect
blacks and whites. Section VIII states conclusions.

II.

Review of Previous Research Related to Local Economic Development and Black
Economic Success
Previous studies provide evidence on how local economic development affects

economic outcomes. This section reviews three categories of such studies: (1) studies of the
general relationship between local growth and economic outcomes, (2) studies with specific
evidence on how local growth and local industrial mix affect black economic outcomes, and
(3) studies of how access to jobs affects black economic outcomes.
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General Studies of Local Growth and Average Economic Outcomes
Bartik (1991) reviews fourteen studies of how local growth affects average economic
outcomes for all groups, including both blacks and whites. Five studies provide evidence on
how local growth affects unemployment or labor force participation; seven studies provide
evidence on how local growth affects wages; and two studies provide evidence on how local
growth affects overall earnings or economic well-being.
These previous studies usually find that faster local growth improves local economic
outcomes. But there is wide disagreement on the exact magnitude of growth effects. For
example, the estimated effects of 1 percent extra growth on unemployment varies from a
reduction of 7/100ths of 1 percent (Fleisher and Rhodes, 1976) to a reduction of 43/100ths of
1 percent (Houseman and Abraham, 1990). The estimated effects of 1 percent extra growth
on real wages varies from no effect (Roback, 1982) up to a 0.5 percent increase (Rosen,
1979).

The Relationship of Black Economic Outcomes to the Overall Local Economy and the Local
Industrial Mix
Table 1 summarizes studies that have estimated how the overall local economy or the
local industrial mix affect black economic outcomes.
All except 2 of the 16 studies in the table find some evidence that a stronger local
economy improves black economic outcomes. The two studies without this finding (Levy,
1982; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1989) illustrate the potential statistical difficulties of estimating
the influence of the local economy on economic outcomes. Both Levy and Ihlanfeldt-Sjoquist
focus their analysis on how the level of economic outcomes for blacks in a given year is

Table 1
Summary of Previous Research on Black Economic Outcomes,
Overall Local Economic Strength, and Local Industrial Mix
Dependent
Variables

Measures of Overall
Local Economy

Eggers and Massey
(1992)

1970 to 1980 change in 59
SMSAs in: black male/
employment/population ratio,
black female employment/
population ratio, black median
family income, and black
poverty rate.

Change in SMSA:
unemployment rate, ratio of
operative and crafts workers
to black population, ratio of
service workers to operative
and crafts workers,
manufacturing earnings per
employee, service earnings
per employee.

All measures of overall
local economy (with
exception of unemploy
ment rate) really also
measure industrial mix.

Lower unemployment consistently improves all
measures of black economic status. Measures
of operative and services employment have
stronger but contradictory effects: shifts
towards operative and away from services
helps male employment, hurts female
employment. But male employment effect
dominates in determining overall poverty.
Manufacturing earnings increases associated
with lower employment but still lower poverty
by increasing income; service earnings
increases do not have strong effects.

Ihlanfeldt (1992)

1980 employment and school
enrollment status of black/
white/Hispanic 16-19 year old
males and females living with
parent(s), in 50 MS As.

Metropolitan area
unemployment rate

Fraction of MSA jobs
that are: operator/
fabricator/laborer;
service; sales; clerical;
precision production/
craft/repair.

Unemployment rate has statistically significant
negative effects on employment rate for all
groups; industrial mix rarely has strong
expected effect on employment rates for
blacks, but does for whites.

Bartik (1991)

Annual weeks in labor force,
annual weeks employed,
annual real earnings, real wage
status of main occupation, and
annual average real wage, of
black and white males ages 25
to 64. Analysis pools CPS
data from 1979 to 1986, and
includes dummy variables for
each MSA, so analysis is
really looking at changes in
economic outcome variables.

MSA employment adjusted
for MSA boundary changes;
because MSA dummy is
included, analysis is really
focused on changes in MSA
employment. Black white
differential is determined by
interacting MSA employ
ment variable with race of
individual, not by separ
ating regressions for each
race.

None

MSA employment growth has significantly
greater percentage effects on black real
earnings than on white real earnings; 1 percent
increase in employment increases average real
earnings by about 4/10ths of 1 percent, and
black real earnings by close to 5/10ths of 1
percent. Most of greater real earnings effect
for blacks due to greater growth effect on
blacks* ability to move up to higher paying
occupations. Growth's effects on black work
activity are very similar to growth's effects on
whites.

Measures of Local
Industrial Mix

Table 1
(Continued)
Dependent
Variables

Measures of Overall
Local Economy

Measures of Local
IndustriaLMix

Bound and Holzer (1991)

1970 to 1980 changes for 52
SMSAs in employment/popula
tion ratios for black males and
white males separately, and
various subgroups; also weekly
wages.

Estimates from Census of
total 1970-80 male
employment growth in
MSA in some regressions;
changes in employment/
population ratios for 35-54
year old white males in
other regressions.

Changes in manufactur
ing share of employ
ment, weighted by that
group's 1970 share of
manufacturing employ
ment in that SMSA.

Both older white employment/population ratios
and manufacturing share have significant
effects on employment/population ratios,
effects which are over twice as strong for
blacks as for whites. Manufacturing share
affects young black high school dropout
employment the most. Wage effects generally
not significant. Estimated male employment
growth does not work very well.

Eggers and Massey
(1991)

1980 level for blacks of male
employment rate, female
employment rate, family
income, poverty rate.

Level in SMSA of:
unemployment rate, ratio of
operative and crafts workers
to black population, ratio of
service workers to operative
and crafts workers, manu
facturing earnings per
employee, service earnings
per employee. Also, state
per capita income.

All measures of overall
local economy (with
exception of unemploy
ment rate and state per
capita income) also
measure industrial mix.

Increase in unemployment rate, decline in state
per capita income, and shifts to services cause
deterioration in all measures of black
economic status. Shifts away from operatives
employment helps male employment, hurts
female, but weak overall effect on poverty.
Decreases in manufacturing and service
earnings do not affect employment rates, but
do depress family income and increase
poverty. Overall unemployment rate, per
capita income, and earnings appear to have
strongest effects.

Freeman (1991)

Individual-level data from
1987 and 1983 from CPS and
NLSY on black and white
male youth unemployment
probabilities, employment
probabilities, wage rates, and
annual earnings. Most
analysis focuses on levels in
given year; one regression
focuses on earnings growth
from 1983 to 1987. Sample
restricted to out-of-school
young men with 12 or less
years of education.

MSA unemployment rate.
Omitted area effects dealt
with in some cases by
including lagged MSA
unemployment rate as
control

None

Both tabulations of dependent variables by
MSAs classified by unemployment rates and
regression analysis, show that earnings are
higher, and unemployment rates are lower, in
areas with low overall unemployment. Effects
on blacks tend to be greater than for whites,
often by magnitude of two or more. Changes
in unemployment rate also appear to be
associated with greater earnings growth.
Magnitude of coefficients are important a 1
point reduction in unemployment increases
black youth employ- ment/population ratio by
2 to 4 rate points, and increases black youth
earnings by 7 percent.

Table 1
(Continued)
Dependent
Variables

Measures of Overall
Local Economy

Measures of Local
Industrial Mix

Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist
(1991)

Probability of employment as
of 1980 Census of 16 to 19
year old black or white
individuals. Sample restricted
to youth living at home and in
central cities.

SMSA unemployment rate
for white, prime age males.

Proportion of youth jobs
in SMSA, based on
national figures on youth
employment by occupa
tion, and distribution of
occupations in SMSA.

Unemployment rate significantly reduces
employment probability for both blacks and
whites, with effect on whites somewhat
greater. Youth job index is insignificant.

Osterman (1991)

Poverty rates for Boston for
blacks and whites in 1987,
compared to poverty rates for
blacks and whites in all central
cities in 1988, and also
compared to Boston and all
central city poverty rates in
1980.

Really just a case study of
Boston, which had very
strong employment growth
1980 to 1987.

Implicit in case study is
that Boston is largely a
white-collar city, and did
not really have manufac
turing boom in 1980s.

Black and white poverty rates declined
dramatically in Boston in 1980s, while they
went up in other U.S. central cities. Poverty
rates in Boston and other central cities were
roughly comparable in 1980, but much lower
in Boston in 1987. Black poverty rates
appeared to go down much more than white
poverty rates in "rate points," but not
necessarily in percentage.

Cain and Finnie (1990)

Annual hours of work in 1979,
black males ages 16-21, in 94
SMSAs; labor force participa
tion in 1980 of black males
ages 16-21.

SMSA averages of annual
hours worked of young
white men; black
unemployment rate; wage
of young white men; SMSA
population change 1970-80.

Percentage of SMSA
population employed in
"youth-intensive"
industries: retail trade,
entertainment, and other
personal services.

All indicators of improvements of overall local
economy increase black youth annual hours
and LFP except for SMSA population change,
and white wage for LFP. Percentage
employed in retail and other "youth industries"
also has positive effects.

Moore and Laramore
(1990)

1980 black and nonblack, male
and female, unemployment and
labor force participation rates
in 98 central cities; control for
1970 rates makes this really
changes regression.

1970-80 percentage change
in central city employment

Both 1970 levels and
1970-80 changes in
shares (out of central city
employment) of manu
facturing; distributionrelated industries;
producer services;
personal services; and
social and government
services. (Manufac
turing only entered in
changes form.)

Overall employment growth has consistently
strong effects on labor force participation
rates, stronger for blacks and females than for
nonblack males. Effects on unemployment are
not significant, although point estimate of
growth effect is negative for blacks.
Reductions in manufacturing share often
significantly reduces labor force participation
and increases unemployment. Level of
producer services has significant negative
effects on unemployment. Unclear how to
interpret these estimated industry coefficients
because excluded industry category not clear.

Table 1
(Continued)
Dependent
Variables

Measures of Overall
Local Economy

Welch (1990)

1970-80 change in employment
population ratio for black men
in 73 SMSAs.

1970-80 change in
unemployment rate of white
men in SMSA; change in
employment/population
ratio of white men.

None shown in paper.

Increase in unemployment had significant
negative effects on black employment for
blacks 16-24 and 25-44, but not 45-64.
Industrial mix is reported to have had negative
effects on blacks, but unclear how variable
defined and size of coefficient.

Hughes (1989)

The number of census tracts in
the MSA in 1980 that are
"impacted ghettos": exceed
twice the SMSA median of
female-headed households,
male joblessness, welfare
receipt, and high school
dropouts.

Percentage change in
manufacturing employment
in central county of MSA
from 1972-82.

Same as for overall local
economy.

Manufacturing decline in central city county
significantly increases number of ghetto tracts.

Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist
(1989)

Annual labor earnings in 1977
of PSID individuals, black and
white men and women, minus
journey to work costs. Sample
restricted to individuals living
in central cities with no more
than a high school education,
and to individuals who were in
labor force or were
discouraged workers.

1980 SMSA unemployment
rate; percentage change in
SMSA population from
1970 to 1980.

None.

Higher unemployment associated with signifi
cantly higher earnings in MSA for black and
white males. Greater population growth
associated with marginally significant greater
earnings for white males and white females,
marginally significant less earnings for black
females.

Stud>

Measures of Local
Industrial Mix

Findings

Table 1
(Continued)
Dependent
Variables

Measures of Overall
Local Economy

Frey and Speare (1988)

1970-80 change in SMSA
labor force participation,
unemployment; and 1969-79
change in SMSA mean family
income, per capita income,
and poverty rate; for all races,
and for blacks separately.

1970-80 Population Growth

None.

Cross-tabulations show pattern that change in
black economic status was much better as one
goes from declining SMSAs to slow growth to
moderate growth to rapid growth. Differences
in changes in economic status across different
growth rate SMSAs seem much greater for
blacks than for overall population. One
interesting difference for poverty: more
growth only makes difference as one goes
from decline to moderate growth, not from
moderate to rapid growth. For other
variables, more growth always increases
positive effects.

Levy (1982)

Probability of an individual
black and white male being
employed in 1979, and annual
1978 earnings and poverty
status of black and white men
and women.

State 1979 unemployment
rate; state rate of job
growth from 1972 to 1977.

None.

On whole, does not find consistent or strong
effects of state variables on these measures of
the current level of the individuals' economic
status. Statistically significant results (fstatistic greater than 2) for blacks include:
1979 unemployment rate increase of 1 point
reduces black male employment rate by over 2
points; increasing job growth associated with
lower black male employment probability and
lower black married female earnings.

Mooney (1969)

Employment to population
ratio of nonwhite males and
females in poorest census
tracts of 25 large SMSAs in
1960.

SMSA total unemployment
rate.

None.

Unemployment rate has large and significant
negative effects on E/P ratio of around (-3) to
1; slightly larger effects for females than
males.

Study

Measures of Local
Industrial Mix

16
affected by both local unemployment rates and overall local growth. Focusing on the level
of black economic outcomes in a given year can yield biased results. Local economies have
many unobserved characteristics. These unobserved characteristics may cause spurious
correlations between black economic outcomes and measures of local economic climate. For
example, a high wage MS A may have higher unemployment rates, because the high wages
make the MSA more attractive to in-migrants; the high wages may increase black earnings,
resulting in a spurious negative correlation between higher MSA unemployment rates and
black wages or earnings.
In addition, including both local unemployment rates and growth in the same
regression creates difficulties of interpretation. Local unemployment rates will drop due to
faster growth. Yet the regression estimates (1) the effects of growth, when unemployment is
held constant, and (2) the effects of unemployment when growth is held constant. The
effects on economic outcomes of one of these variables, when the other is held constant, may
not be an interesting issue from a policy perspective: one would usually expect policies that
stimulate the local economy to change both variables. In addition, including both variables
together may mask the effects on economic outcomes that occur when both variables change
together.4
The studies in table 1 modestly support the hypothesis that the effect of the overall
local economy are greater for blacks, compared to whites. Of the nine studies that consider

4 In addition, both Levy and Ihlanfeldt/Sjoquist suffer from timing problems: the year of
their dependent variable does not exactly match the year of their measures of the overall
local economy. For example, Levy considers 1979 economic outcomes as a function of 1972
to 1977 growth; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist consider 1978 economic outcomes as a function of
1980 unemployment and 1970 to 1980 growth.
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this issue, six find stronger effects on blacks than on whites (Bound and Holzer; Freeman;
Bartik; Frey and Speare; Osterman; Mooney); two find similar effects on blacks and whites
(Ihlanfeldt; Welch); and one finds stronger effects on whites (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist).
The effects of local industrial mix on black economic outcomes are unclear from
previous studies. Six studies find evidence that local industrial mix makes a difference (the
two Eggers and Massey studies; Bound and Holzer; Cain and Finnic; Hughes; and Moore
and Laramore); two studies do not find significant effects of industrial mix (Ihlanfeldt;
Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist). But 3 of the 6 studies that find industrial mix effects define their
industrial mix variables so that a change in the industrial mix variable will change overall
MSA employment. These three studies do not hold MSA employment growth constant (the
Eggers and Massey studies; Hughes). These three studies' industrial mix effects may
actually be due to the effects of faster MSA employment growth. For example, Eggers and
Massey (1992) use as an industrial mix variable the 1970-80 change in the ratio of operative
and crafts workers to the black population. Increases in operative and crafts workers in the
MSA will be associated with greater MSA employment growth, which is not held constant in
Eggers and Massey's regressions.
Of the remaining three studies that find industrial mix effects, two (Bound and
Holzer; Moore and Laramore) find some negative effects on blacks of a declining
manufacturing share. The Cain and Finnic study finds that black youths are helped by
increases in an MSA's youth oriented jobs.
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The Spatial Mismatch Literature: Effects of Job Access on Black Economic Outcomes
The research literature on the effects on black outcomes of being spatially close to
jobs the "spatial mismatch" literature has recently been reviewed by Holzer (1991) and
Ihlanfeldt (1992). This type of research is hard to conduct, for two reasons. First, job
access is hard to measure. Second, the direction of causation between job access and black
economic outcomes is unclear. For example, persons who obtain good jobs may move to the
suburbs, where there is strong manufacturing growth. Access to manufacturing jobs may
appear to cause black economic success when the truth is that black economic success causes
improved job access.
Probably the best studies of the spatial mismatch hypothesis have been done by
Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1989, 1990, 1991) and Ihlanfeldt (1992). Their studies focus on the
economic outcomes of black youths living at home, for whom it is most plausible that
residential location is "exogenous", that is that residential location is a cause rather than a
result of labor market experiences.5 In addition, their studies measure job access in a
"neighborhood" using commuting travel times for a large sample of neighborhood residents.
Their studies also measure travel time for jobs for which black youth are likely to be
qualified. This measure of job access seems superior to alternative measures (jobs within 30
minutes commute, etc.). The Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist studies find large effects on black
youths of spatial accessibility of jobs.

5Black youths living at home might be different from other black youths. This raises the
possibility of selection bias. But it is unclear why selection bias would lead to biased
estimates of the effects of job access. There is no obvious reason for the unobserved
attributes of black youths living at home to differ between high-access and low-access
neighborhoods.
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But it seems premature to declare a consensus on the basis of the findings of one
group of researchers. Furthermore, the research by Ellwood (1986) finds the effect of job
access on youth employment rates to be small. Ell wood's research also uses travel time as
an access measure, and also focuses on youth economic outcomes. Ellwood's research
considers only Chicago while Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist consider more cities, and Ellwood's
data and travel time measures may be more subject to measurement error than Ihlanfeldt and
Sjoquist's (Ihlanfeldt, 1992; Kasarda, 1989; Leonard, 1986). Still, Ellwood's findings do
raise some doubt about whether spatial access to jobs affects black economic outcomes.

III.

Methodology and Data

The new research for this report examines how the changes over time in different
economic outcomes for different groups of blacks and whites in a metropolitan area are
affected by changes in several characteristics of metropolitan economic development. This
section outlines the methodology used and describes the construction of the variables used.
The technical appendix has more details on the methodology and data.
The methodology and data used here have some advantages over those of previous
research. First, the methodology is designed so that estimates will not be biased by
unobserved area characteristics that affect the level of economic outcome variables.
Unobserved area characteristics can cause spurious correlations between the levels of
economic outcome and economic development variables. Second, compared to previous
research, the analysis considers more groups and more types of economic outcomes.
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Finally, the methodology defines the industrial mix class of economic development variables
so that industrial mix and metropolitan growth can change independently. The industrial mix
variables all depend on the types of industries in the metropolitan area, not the metropolitan
area's size or growth.

Specification of the Estimating Equations
The basic model is a regression model using pooled time series of cross sections.
The cases are MSA-year combinations, where "year" refers to one-year periods for which the
variables measure percentage change. Many versions of the model are used, one for each
dependent variable. In general, the time-series includes 16 periods, ranging from 1973-74 to
1988-89. The number of MS As included for a given period ranges from 34 in the early
1970s to over 200 in the late 1980s. The model includes a time dummy for each period
except the first. Other variables, both dependent and independent, generally measure oneyear percentage change in either an MS A mean economic outcome (e.g., average real
personal earnings) or some aspect of the MSA's economic climate that might be a causal
influence (e.g., manufacturing employment as a percentage of total MS A employment). The
dependent variables always describe a specific demographic group (e.g., black high school
dropouts). The estimation procedure corrects for both heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation. To correct for heteroskedasticity, cases are weighted using weights that are
based on the statistical precision with which the percentage change in MSA mean economic
outcomes are measured. This report's technical appendix gives more information on the
rationale behind pooling and on the validity of the heteroskedasticity corrections.
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The basic equation is as follows:

%LYmu - a+b TIME t c(L)%^DEVEWPmt * ^
where %A7 is the dependent variable, expressed as a one-year percentage change in some
demographic group's MSA average economic outcome for the period that the particular
MSA-year case represents; TIME is a vector of one-year period dummies, one for each
period except the first; %ADEVELOP is a vector of independent variables, intended to
measure changes in various characteristics of the MSAs that describe its economic
development, broadly defined; m designates a particular MSA; t designates the time period; g
designates the demographic group being considered; a is the regression constant; b and c
represent the coefficients on the variables; c(L) is notation that indicates that some
specifications include lagged as well as current values of the economic development
variables, with the coefficients on these lagged variables estimated without constraints; and e
is the error term.
Controlling time dummies avoids making inferences based on national trends in the
economic outcome and economic development variables. These national trends could be
spuriously correlated. Instead, this study focuses on explaining differences from one MSA to
another in the year to year changes in economic outcomes. These MSA differences in the
change in economic outcomes are assumed to be in part caused by differences from one MSA
to another in the change in the economic development variables.
This specification has the advantage of eliminating possible biases due to fixed
unobserved MSA characteristics. For example, some MSAs may be low-wage areas because
they are attractive places to live; some might attract more high technology industries, because
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they are attractive places to live. As a result, a high tech MSA industrial structure could be
negatively correlated with MSA wages, even though high tech employment does not cause
lower wages. But by focusing on year-to-year changes in measuring the dependent and
independent variables, the methodology eliminates any unobserved fixed MSA
characteristics. 6
The long-run effect on an economic outcome variable of a permanent change in an
MSA economic development variable is the sum of the coefficients on all current and lagged
values of that economic development variable. For example, suppose a specification includes
the current change in an economic development variable, the once-lagged change in that
same economic development variable, and the twice-lagged change. Then the cumulative
effect on the level of the economic outcome variable of a permanent 1 percent increase in the
economic development variable will at first be given by the coefficient on the current change,
after 1 year by the coefficient on the current change plus the coefficient on the lagged
change, and after 2 or more years by the sum of all three coefficients.
An important issue in specifying this model is how many lags of the economic
development variables to include. As more and more lags are added, estimates become more
and more imprecise. To choose an optimal lag length, this report will use Schwartz's
Bayesian Criterion (SBC), a standard model selection criterion. Geweke and Meese (1981)
present arguments for the superiority of the SBC over other model selection criteria.

6 There could of course also be unobserved MSA characteristics that change in some
systematic way over the time period being analyzed. These MSA fixed trend effects could
cause bias in a changes specification. The technical appendix analyzes this issue further.
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The SBC in the current report usually chooses models with only current changes in
economic development variables, and no lagged changes, particularly for black groups. The
choice of zero lags does not mean that the effects of economic development variables are
unchanged over time; it means that any changed effects are modest enough that including
them is not statistically optimal. To allow comparison across different groups and outcomes,
the emphasis in the report will be on the long-run estimated effects for the zero-lag
specification. Results for longer-lag specifications will be mentioned when the longer-lag
specification might lead to different inferences.

Dependent Variables
The data on the dependent variables, the percentage change in an MSA's average
economic outcomes, are derived from the Annual Demographic File of the Current
Population Survey from March 1974 to March 1990. Each Annual Demographic File
contains data on the "economic outcomes" (personal earnings, income, work, and so on) of
sampled persons and families during the preceding year. My procedure for constructing the
dependent variables began by calculating, for each economic outcome variable and
demographic group considered, a "regression-adjusted" mean for each identified metropolitan
area and each year that controlled the individual's characteristics. Each dependent variable is
then simply the percentage change from one year to the next of that "regression-adjusted"
MSA mean.7

7 As noted in Table 2, the actual percentage change numbers used in the regression are
calculated using as a base the overall mean of that adjusted economic outcome variable for
that demographic group. This base was used because for some MSA-year cases the adjusted
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Table 2 describes the dependent variables. Real annual personal earnings is the best
measure of a person's economic success. The other variables either measure things that
determine personal earnings (weeks worked, weekly earnings, etc.) or measure the person's
poverty status, which is strongly influenced by personal earnings. The groups considered
permit analysis of how the effects of economic development policies vary by race, education,
age, and gender.
The regression adjustment procedure worked as follows. For each year of the Annual
Demographic files, a number of regressions were estimated. The observations for each
regression were on individuals. The sample for each regression was all persons in identified
MS As in a particular demographic group, such as black males 16 and over (see table 2).
Each regression had as a dependent variable some economic outcome measure, such as real
personal earnings. Each regression used as independent variables a number of personal
characteristics (education, experience, and gender) and a full set of dummy variables
identifying the person's metropolitan area. Using these regression coefficients for a given
outcome measure, year, and demographic group, I then predicted, for each metropolitan area
identified in the CPS in that year, what we would expect that economic outcome variable to
be for a person with "mean values" of personal characteristics. The means used for these
predictions were usually the mean values for blacks for these personal characteristics in

mean for some economic outcome variables and some demographic groups is less than or
equal to zero. Calculating percentage change on a base of last year's value is not a sensible
procedure for those cases. The technical appendix further discusses this issue of calculating
percentage change. For the poverty rate variable, the "percentage" change in the year-to-year
change in the adjusted percentage in poverty in the MSA, not the percentage change in that
rate. For example, if black poverty changed from 30% to 27% in an MSA, this would be a
decline of 3% and not 10%.

Table 2
Outline of Dependent Variables
TYPES OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES USED

One-year percentage change in MSA's "adjusted mean" of annual real personal
earnings
Determinants of personal earnings:
One-year percentage change in MSA's
One-year percentage change in MSA's
force
One-year percentage change in MSA's
worked/weeks in labor force
One-year percentage change in MSA's
week
One-year percentage change in MSA's
week
One-year percentage change in MSA's
hour worked

"adjusted mean" of annual weeks worked
"adjusted mean" of annual weeks in labor
"adjusted mean" of annual weeks
"adjusted mean" of average real earnings per
"adjusted mean" of usual hours worked per
"adjusted mean" of average real earnings per

Poverty
One-year change in MSA's "adjusted mean" of poverty rate
GROUPS FOR WHICH DEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE CALCULATED
Blacks 16 and over
Whites 16 and over
Black high school dropouts 25 and over
Black high school completers 25 and over
White high school dropouts 25 and over
White high school completers 25 and over
Black youth: 16-24
Black prime-age: 25-54
Black older persons: 55 and over
White youth: 16-24
White prime-age: 25-54
White older persons: 55 and over
Black males 16 and over
Black females 16 and over
White males 16 and over
White females 16 and over
Notes: All real earnings/income figures are adjusted for estimated local prices, as described in technical
appendix. Percentage change is calculated by dividing the one-year absolute change in a particular outcome
measure by the sample mean of that outcome for that demographic group and then multiplying by 100. MSA
means are "adjusted" using regression procedures described in text. High school completion/dropout status
based on whether completed 12 years of school. Drop-out and completer groups only include persons 25 and
older because younger persons are more likely to still be completing education.
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1986. 8 For example, real personal earnings for whites in New York in 1977 are predicted
using the regression coefficients from the 1977 regression for real personal earnings. These
predictions estimate what earnings would have been for whites in New York in 1977 if their
education, experience, and proportion of each gender were the same as was true of the
average black in the U.S. in 1986.
For some groups and characteristics, it makes no sense to hold characteristics constant
at the overall black means in 1986. For example, it makes no sense to calculate what a
typical white 16 to 24-year old's earnings would have been if his experience had been at the
average black's experience level in 1986, or what the average white high school completer's
earnings would have been if he had been at the same education level as the 1986 black
average. Education by definition varies with status as a high school dropout and completer,
and experience by definition varies with the age group. For these groups and characteristics,
predictions used the black means for the comparable group in 1986. Thus, the white dropout
predictions for 1974 would use the mean education levels of black high school dropouts in
1986, and the white high school completer predictions would use the mean education of black
high school completers in 1986; all other individual characteristics would still be kept
constant at the overall 1986 black mean.
The dependent variable for each equation is the year to year percentage change in an
MSA in the predicted value of one of the economic outcome variables. An alternative would
have been to simply use the year to year percentage change in the MSA's mean value of that

8 1986 was somewhat arbitrarily chosen as a reference point, simply because the
empirical work began using the March 1987 CPS.
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economic outcome variable. I chose to use as dependent variables the changes in predicted
values these "regression adjusted means" rather than changes in simple MSA means. The
reason for this choice is that I want to examine why economic outcomes differ across MSAs,
years, and groups for persons who are otherwise similar. For some groups, such as high
school dropouts and completers, some characteristics education in this case should be
allowed to differ between the two groups, but all other characteristics should be held constant
to permit a valid comparison.

Independent Variables
Table 3 lists and defines the study's independent variables. To repeat, the
independent variables (like the dependent) generally measure one-year percentage changes in
some MSA characteristic.9 The independent variables are of three types: a measure of
metropolitan employment growth, many measures of changes in local industrial mix, a
measure of employment decentralization. All of these independent variables can be
considered to be "economic development" variables because state and local economic
development policies aim directly at influencing these MSA characteristics. State and local
economic development policies provide tax breaks, financial assistance, or services directly
to individual firms. These policies' immediate goal is to affect local growth, the types of
industries in the area, or the geographic distribution of industries within the area.

9 These percentage changes, as shown in the table, are generally measured as 100 times
the change in some natural logarithm. The only variable not measured in percentage terms is
the education variable, which is measured as the annual change in demand for years of
education.

Table 3
Description and Definition
of Economic Development Variables
MSA EMPLOYMENT GROWTH:

[ln(MSA employment in year /) - ln(MSA employment in year / - 7)] times 100.
Employment data uses 1989 MSA definitions and comes from BEA's Regional
Economic Information System.
MSA DECENTRALIZATION:

"MSA EMPLOYMENT GROWTH" - {[In(employment in county containing
central city in year f) - ln(employment in county containing central city in year
t- 7)] times 100}.
MSA WAGE PREMIUM CHANGE:

imt

^r1

*
' imt-1

where wt is estimated industry / percentage "wage premium" (difference between average
wage in industry and what we would expect based on workers' characteristics) from Table II
of Krueger and Summers (1988), and s±mtis estimated share of two-digit industry / in total
private non-agricultural employment in MSA m in year t. Krueger and Summers' wage
premiums are differences in the logarithm of wages across industries, and are multiplied by
100 before being used in this study.
MSA EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS CHANGE:

Ei' Simt ~ £ Ei' Simt-\

i

i

where Et is average years of education in 2-digit industry / calculated from March 1990 CPS,
and Stnt is industry /'s share of total MSA employment.

Table 3
(Continued)
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SHARE OF MSA DEMAND FOR DEMOGRAPHIC
GROUP j:

times 100 where Djmt = £ G.S,imt'
and Gy = proportion of 2-digit industry /'s employment that consists of persons in
demographic group j. These proportions are calculated using data from March 1990 CPS on
all persons 16 and over. Demographic group variables are defined for all groups listed in
Table 2. For drop-outs and completers, G{j calculated based on all individuals 16 and over.
MSA Change in Manufacturing Share

This is simply defined as change from t -1 to t in the percentage of the MSA's total
employment in manufacturing industries.

Note: All 2-digit industry numbers come from estimates based on ES-202 industry data and
REIS data. Procedure for estimating suppressed industries is described in the technical
appendix.
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The overall growth and decentralization measures are straightforward. The growth
measure is the year to year percentage change in employment in the MSA. This study's
calculations of MSA growth use 1990 boundaries of MSAs. The decentralization measure is
the difference between the overall percentage growth in the MSA and the percentage
employment growth in the county containing the MSA's central city. This difference is also
equal to the percentage change in the ratio of MSA employment to employment in the MSA's
"central city" county. In MSAs in which employment is more rapidly moving to the
suburbs, this variable will take on larger values. If blacks have greater difficulty in getting
access, by transportation or information networks, to suburban jobs, then this
decentralization variable will be negatively correlated with black access to jobs. This
measure of access is crude compared to direct measures of job access, such as average
commuting time to jobs. But this decentralization variable is the best reflection of access
available on a year-to-year basis for many MSAs.
The local industrial mix variables are all measures of the MSA's "average" value of
industry characteristics, based on the MSA's industrial mix and national data on industries.
The "wage premium" changes variable measures how MSA wages would change due to due
to changes in the proportion of MSA employment in industries that pay well or poorly
relative to the worker's credentials. This calculation uses national data on wage premiums
by industry to calculate these changes in the average MSA wage premium. The educational
requirement change variable measures changes in the average years of education demanded in
the MSA, if each industry demanded workers with the same number of years of education as
they typically employ in the nation. The demographic change economic development
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variables measure changes in the proportion of metropolitan employment demand for
different demographic groups. The calculation for this variable assumes that each industry in
the metropolitan area allocates the same proportion of its employment demand to that
demographic group as it did in the nation in 1989.
These industry mix variables are all meant to measure different ways in which
changes in local industry mix might affect local labor demand. National industry
characteristics are used in calculating these industry mix variable to avoid effects of local
labor supply conditions on these variables. For example, the percentage of industry
employment that goes to a particular demographic group in an MSA would be expected to
increase if the local labor supply of that group in the MSA increases.
Table 4 lists how some of these industry characteristics vary across industries. Most
industry characteristics vary as one might expect. Some manufacturing industries are high
wage premium, but so are certain service industries such as communications and public
utilities. Female employment is concentrated in particular service industries and in a few
manufacturing industries such as apparel. Educational levels are high in legal services,
banking, and civilian government agencies but low in eating and drinking places. Other
industry characteristics may be less familiar. The large concentration of black high school
completers in government, and in certain quasi-public utilities such as communications is of
interest, as is the concentration of black high school dropouts in eating and drinking places
and apparel and textiles.

Table 4
Variation of Selected Industry Characteristics
Across Industries
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16.4
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Note: Wage premium numbers come from Krueger and Summers (1988), Table II. These "percentage wage
differential" are actually 100 times the change in the log of the total compensation differential. Note that some of their
categories include several 2-digit industries here. Other numbers are calculated from March 1990 CPS. To avoid
problems of SIC definitional change, some SIC codes are combined: (36, 38); (60, 61); (63, 64, 65, 66); and (73, 78,
87, 89).
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The Direction of Causation Issue
The policy issue motivating this report is the effect of changes in MSA economic
climate on persons' economic outcomes. The coefficients on the economic development
variables could be interpreting as reflecting this direction of cause and effect, from change in
MSA economic development to changes in economic outcomes. But causation could also go
in the reverse direction, from changes in persons' economic outcomes to changes in MSA
economic development. This reverse direction of causation biases the estimated coefficients.
For example, MSA employment growth would be expected to increase wages, contributing to
a positive correlation between growth and wage increases. But MSA wage increases may
discourage employment growth, contributing to a negative correlation between growth and
wage increases. In an equation with MSA wage change as a dependent variable, the
coefficients on MSA employment growth may reflect both directions of causation. The
coefficients may be biased estimates of the true effects of MSA employment growth on
wages.
This report does not attempt to untangle the direction of causation between MSA
economic development and economic outcomes. But previous research has suggested that
this theoretical econometric issue may not be of large practical importance. For example,
estimates in Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) suggest that the biases caused by
ignoring the "endogeneity" of MSA economic development are modest.
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IV.

Preliminary Analysis of Trends in Dependent and Independent Variables

National Trends in "Regression-Adjusted" Personal Earnings for Large MSAs
To get a sense of the overall economic differences between blacks and whites, and to
get a sense of the effects of "regression adjustment," figures 1 and 2 show national average
trends for real personal earnings for blacks and whites. The national average personal
earnings numbers in figures 1 and 2 use only persons in the 33 metropolitan areas that are
consistently identified in the CPS from 1973 to 1989. Figure 1 shows simple weighted
national means over these 33 MSAs for each year; figure 2 shows weighted regression
adjusted means.
As shown in the regression adjusted figure 2, when education, age, and gender are
controlled, black earnings shows ups and downs but no strong consistent trend for the overall
1973-89 period. The overall black real earnings trend was slightly downward, with a decline
of 2.5% from 1973 to 1989. White earnings, with characteristics controlled, also showed no
strong trend for this period; there was just a slight increase of 0.1 percent from 1973 to
1989. Both black and white earners suffered large earnings losses during this period's two
recessions, in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s.
A comparison of figures 1 and 2 suggests that the regression adjustment procedure
has two main effects. First, the adjustment reduces the black-white differential, because
whites on average have better educations than blacks. But even after the adjustment—even
when we are comparing blacks and whites with similar characteristics—blacks still earn
considerably less than whites. Second, the adjustment eliminates almost all of 1973-89's

Figure 1: Trends in Black and White
Real Personal Earnings, 1973-89
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Figure 2: Trends in Black and White
Real Predicted Personal Earnings, 1973-89,
Holding Constant Individual Characteristics
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observed real earnings growth. The average education and experience of both blacks and
whites grew during the 1970s and 1980s, increasing both black and white earnings. By
controlling education and experience, we compare blacks in 1989 with blacks in 1973 who
had similar characteristics, and the same holds true for whites. Once we control education
and experience, there is no significant growth in real earnings for blacks or whites from
1973-89.
Table 5 reports the percentage growth in adjusted real earnings for various black and
white subgroups. Among blacks, many subgroups did especially poorly: dropouts, young
persons, older persons, and males. Among whites, the subgroups that did relatively poorly
included dropouts, older persons, and males. When we compare blacks and whites, blacks
did more poorly than whites among all subgroups, and considerably more poorly than whites
(8 percent or more "earnings growth" gap) among all subgroups except prime-age persons
and high school completers. These estimated trends seem generally consistent with those
found in other recent research. The other research shows widening of the black-white
earnings gap among various subgroups of blacks and whites (e.g., Bound and Freeman's
(1992) analysis of earnings trends for black and white younger males).

Differences in Economic Trends Across MSAs
These national trends conceal large differences in economic outcome trends in
different MSAs. The pattern of variation across MSAs differs between blacks and whites.
Figure 3 shows the percentage growth in adjusted personal earnings for blacks and whites for

Table 5
Estimated Percentage Change in Regression-Adjusted
Real Personal Earnings, 1973-89,
Weighted Average Over 33 MSAs Consistently in CPS

Blacks

Whites

-2.5%

0.1%

High School Dropouts
High School Completers

-33.7%
3.6%

-21.4%
5.4%

Youth 16-24
Prime Age 25-54
Older GE 55

-9.5%
-3.7%
-16.4%

2.7%
2.3 %
-3.6%

Males
Females

-22.7%
26.4%

-13.9%
41.6%

Overall

Notes: Although percentage change numbers for sub-groups may seem inconsistent with overall numbers, note
that overall percentage change should at best only approximately be weighted sum—using initial earnings shares
of sub-groups as weights—of subgroup percentage changes. So, for example, overall white percentage change
puts greater weight on white males than on white females because white male earnings average much more than
white female earnings. This is also true for blacks, but to a lesser extent. This approximate summation will
also be inexact because: adjusted numbers for each sub-group and overall numbers are based on separate
regressions, and adjustment procedure calculates adjusted means at different mean values of some individual
characteristics; the education sub-groups only include individuals 25 and over, while all other groups and overall
numbers are based on all individuals 16 and over.

Figure 3: Percentage Growth in Real Regression Adjusted Personal Earnings
for Blacks and Whites, 10 Large MSAs, Late 1970s to Late 1980s
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10 large MSAs from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. Although black earnings overall may
be stagnant, black earnings increased greatly in Newark, Washington, D.C., and Los
Angeles; black earnings enormously decreased in Chicago, Detroit, and Houston.
Furthermore, although there is some correlation between black and white earnings trends,
whites did much better than blacks in some cities (e.g., Baltimore, Detroit, Houston, Miami,
and New York), whereas black earnings growth exceeded white earnings growth in Los
Angeles and Washington, D.C. I calculated the simple correlation between black and white
real earnings growth from the late 1970s to the late 1980s for all 44 MSAs included in the
CPS in both years. The estimated correlation between black and white earnings growth by
metropolitan area was positive and significant (probability=.082), but at a surprisingly
modest magnitude (r=.27).
This enormous variety of trends across MSAs may be surprising. But it is consistent
with the findings of some previous research. For example, Jargowsky and Bane's analysis
(1991) of ghetto poverty trends from 1970 to 1980s revealed that "ghetto poverty increased
dramatically in large northern cities, and decreased equally dramatically in many southern
cities" (p. 269).
This variation across metropolitan areas is consistent with the premise of this research
that trends in black poverty may be in part explained by local economic forces. At least
there is some variation across metropolitan areas that can potentially be statistically
explained; whether this explanation can give clues to the overall national trends depends on
what metropolitan variables do the best job of explaining differences in metropolitan
economic outcomes.
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National Trends in Economic Development Variables
The national trends in these metropolitan industry mix variables generally are what
one would expect. The female and youth employment demand variables show increases over
time due to the shift to services. Average educational requirements have gone up as the
economy has shifted to higher education industries. Figure 4 shows the trends in a less
familiar variable, the wage premium variable. This variable has declined considerably,
dropping about one-and-a-half percent from the late 1970s to the late 1980s.
The trends in the black employment demand variables are more surprising. The black
high school completer demand variable has declined over time, while the black high school
dropout demand variable has increased (Figures 5 and 6). Black high school completer
demand appears to have stagnated in large part because of sluggish employment growth in
government and the quasi-government communication industry. These industries employ
large shares of black high school completers.
Black high school dropout demand has held up due to increased demand for
employment in eating and drinking establishments and private household services. These are
industries in which black high school dropouts have particularly large shares. 10 In the
overall economy, employment is shifting towards industries that employ more high school
completers compared to high school dropouts. But the industry distribution of blacks by
educational level differs greatly from that of whites. Industry shifts are not increasing the

10 These statements about the causes of these trends are based on a decomposition of the
causes of these trends by industry, which is presented in the technical appendix.

Figure 4: Trends in Average MSA Industry Wage Premiums,
All MSAs

Average MSA Industry Wage Premium (Percent)
1.0

0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

Years
Note: All numbers are averages over 316 MSAs
weighted by MSA total employment.

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

Figure 5: Trends in Average Industry Mix
Prediction of Proportion of Employment Demand
for Black High School Completers, All MSAs
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Figure 6: Trends in Average Industry Mix
Prediction of Proportion of Employment Demand
for Black High School Dropouts, All MSAs
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demand for black high school completers compared to black high school dropouts. This
surprising trend has previously been noted by Bound and Freeman (1992).

Variations in Economic Development Trends Across MSAs
The change across MSAs in these measures of economic development shows
considerable diversity across MSAs, and the different economic development measures show
some independence. Table 6 shows the 1979-89 change in selected economic development
variables for 11 large MSAs. These MSA include the 10 MSAs for which economic
outcome changes were previously presented in figure 3; Boston is included as a well-known
case in which metropolitan growth was quite healthy from 1979 to at least 1988. Although
the qualitative trends are often similar, the magnitude of these economic development trends
often differ considerably. For example, most MSAs tended to suffer from a reduced average
wage premium, but in MSAs such as Detroit the decline was worse. There is also some
independence of the measures; for example, Boston suffered from considerable
deindustrialization, yet its wage premium during the 1980s stayed almost the same.
The interrelationship among a number of these variables is further explored in table
7, which provides a correlation matrix across MSAs for the 1979-89 changes in many of
these variables. Growth tends to be strongly positively correlated with change in the wage
premium, and strongly negatively correlated with change in female labor demand. The wage
premium variable is strongly positively correlated with growth and increases in the
manufacturing share; it is negatively correlated with changes in female and youth demand.
The education and high school dropout variables are not strongly correlated with any other

Table 6
1979-89 Change in Selected Economic Development
Variables for 11 Large MS As
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Baltimore

21.9

-47.4

-1.9

17.6

-2.5

3.9

3.7

-1.0

Boston

23.0

-35.1

-0.8

11.2

-2.8

0.9

1.1

-3.4

Chicago

11.1

-40.5

-1.9

6.2

-0.2

3.5

3.3

-2.4

Detroit

7.9

-33.2

-3.1
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-2.0

Houston

17.0

-43.3
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4.1
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Los Angeles
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Washington, DC

34.7

0.6

0.6

24.1

-5.4

0.7

3.6

3.9

Notes: Percentage change numbers are actually 100 times change in natural logarithm.
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Table 7

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of
Changes in Selected Economic Development Variables, 1979-89
Mean
% Change in Employment
% Change in Manufacturing Share
% Change in Decentralization
% Change in Wage Premium
% Change in Female Share
% Change in Black Share
% Change in Dropout Share
% Change in Youth Share
Change in Educational Requirements

# of Observations

Standard Deviation

19.3
-24.2
2.8
-1.7
4.8
0.0
-1.9
3.2
.065

15.3
16.9
6.5
1.3
3.4
2.7
3.1
2.9
0.051

314
314
140
314
314
314
314
314
314

60

•*i
<O

3

ll
Jl H

% Change in
Employment
% Change in
Manufac. Share
% Change in
Decentralization
% Change in
Wage Premium
% Change in
Female Share
% Change in
Black Share
% Change in
Dropout Share
% Change in
Youth Share

0-328
(0.0001)

^

«f

0.056
(0.512)

0.672
(0.0001)

-0.572
(0.0001)

-0.445
(0.0001)

0.070
(0.214)

-0.474
(0.0001)

-0.287
(0.0001)

-0.082
(0.336)

0.562
(0.0001)

-0.211
(0.0002)

-0.035
(0.540)

0.095
(0.092)

-0.421
(0.0001)

-0.226
(0.0001)

0.139
(0.100)

-0.104
(0.221)

-0.104
(0.221)

-0.026
(0.762)

-0.048
(0.570)

0.023
(0.792)

-0.676
(0.0001)

-0.389
(0.0001)

-0.128
(0.023)

-0.775
(0.0001)

-0.153
(0.007)

0.581
(0.0001)

-0.006
(0.911)

0.373
(0.0001)

0.338
(0.0001)

-0.085
(0.132)

0.214
(0.0001)

0.201
(0.0003)

0.236
(0.0001)

-0.890
(0.0001)
-0.021
(0.717)

Table 7
(Continued)
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. " % changes" are really 100 times changes in natural logarithm of each
variable. For correlation table, number in parentheses is probability of correlation that large in absolute value
under null hypotheses that correlation is zero. Correlation based on 314 MS As, except for those involving
decentralization, which are based on 140 MSAs.
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variables, but are so strongly correlated with each other (negatively) that one variable clearly
can serve as a proxy for the other one. The change in black labor demand is most strongly
positively correlated with changes in female labor demand. 11
These correlations are high enough to reemphasize that these different economic
development variables should not be looked on as independent of one another. These
economic development variables are probably causally linked. For example, growing MS As
may tend to have predictable changes in industrial mix, and certain types of changes in
industrial mix may be favorable towards growth. 12 On the other hand, the correlations are
not large enough to prevent possible inferences about which economic development
characteristics have the most powerful effects on black and white economic outcomes.
I also used some regressions to describe the pattern of change in these economic
development variables across different regions and MS A sizes (table 8). These regressions
each used the 1979-89 percentage change in one of the economic development variables for
an MSA as the dependent variable. The independent variables were different polynomials in
the 1979 employment size of the MSA, and dummy variables for the MSA's regions. Larger
size is associated with greater employment growth for MS As near in size to the mean MSA,
although increased size decreases growth for the largest MS As. 13 Larger MS As also
11 These statements about "strong" correlations somewhat arbitrarily consider a "strong"
correlation to be one that is greater than 0.5 in absolute value.
12 In Section VI, I present some evidence that growth and increases in the wage premium
have a mutual cause-and-effect relationship, and discuss some reasons for such a relationship.
13 The MSA with the mean natural log of employment in 1979 has employment around
144,000. The derivative of 1979-89 growth with respect to 1979 size is positive up to about
6.4 times the size of the mean MSA, or up to around 922,000 in MSA employment. Only a
few MS As have total employment exceeding 922,000.

Table 8
Estimates of How 1979-89 Changes in MSA Economic
Development Variables Are Related
to 1979 MSA Size and Region of MSA
Dependent Variable

Emp%
Grol wtymhent

Change
in
Educational
00
W)

'a i

«&

-S

Change
%
in

GO CO
3 4>

Independent Variables

Requirements

Yout
Sharhe

M

Intercept

18.9
(16.78)

-23.3
(-18.15)

-1.7
(17.16)

5.0
(18.68)

0.01
(0.06)

3.0
(13.25)

0.038
(3.39)

-0.032
(-2.51)

0.001
(1.01)

-0.005
(-1.79)

-0.007
(-3.83)

-0.003
(-1.41)

0.000004
(0.10)

Deviation2 times 10"2

0.012
(1.03)

-0.015
(-1.13)

0.0002
(0.17)

-0.003
(-1.11)

-0.0005
(-0.28)

0.002
(0.81)

0.000003
(0.06)

Deviation3 times 10"4

-0.008
(-1.81)

0.006
(1.22)

0.00002
(0.05)

0.001
(0.90)

0.0007 -0.0006 0.000004
(0.25)
(0.95) (-0.69)

New England

3.4
(1.06)

-13.8
(-3.76)

0.2
(0.68)

-2.5
(-3.22)

-1.7
(-3.12)

-0.5
(-0.72)

0.016
(1.32)

Mid Atlantic

-6.1
(-3.09)

-14.3
(-6.30)

-0.6
(-3.48)

-0.5
(-0.96)

-0.5
(-1.43)

1.3
(3.27)

0.003
(0.35)

East North Central

-9.0
(-5.73)

-3.2
(-1.80)

-0.7
(-5.27)

0.5
(1.23)

0.6
(2.10)

1.2
(3.67)

-0.005
(-0.80)

West North Central

-2.5
(-1.02)

4.2
(1.53)

0.03
(0.13)

0.2
(0.29)

1.1
(2.62)

-0.2
(-0.44)

-0.004
(-0.49)

East South Central

-2.8
(-1.00)

6.1
(1.93)

0.08
(0.31)

-0.5
(-0.78)

-0.7
(-1.39)

1.1
(2.01)

-0.021
(-1.97)

West South Central

-4.6
(-2.52)

1.4
(0.66)

0.05
(0.29)

2.7
(6.14)

2.2
(6.82)

-0.7
(-1.98)

0.024
(3.46)

Mountain

5.0
(1.75)

8.6
(2.64)

0.3
(1.36)

1.2
(1.73)

0.9
(1.79)

-1.8
(-3.11)

0.002
(0.19)

Pacific

8.5
(4.06)

10.6
(4.43)

0.6
(3.48)

-1.3
(-2.60)

-0.5
(-1.42)

-1.5
(-3.45)

-0.022
(-2.71)

South Atlantic

12.1
(7.33)

2.2
(1.15)

0.6
(3.78)

-1.2
(-2-95)

-1.9
(-6.53)

-0.2
(-0.52)

0.002
(0.33)

Significance of F-test
for Employment Variables

0.007

0.022

0.313

0.068

0.0003

0.107

0.833

Significance of F-test
for Region Dummies

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

0.0040

Percentage Deviation of
(MSA Employment in 1979)
from mean over all MSAs

0.064
(15.01)

Table 8
(Continued)
Note: All estimates are based on 314 MSAs. Dependent variable is 100 times change from 1979 to 1989 in
natural logarithm of each variable, except for education, which is in years, /-statistics are in parentheses.
F-test probabilities are probabilities of F-test statistic for a group of variables under null hypothesis that all
coefficients in that group are zero. Employment deviation variable defined as [100 times ln(1979 MS A
employment)] minus mean of that variable over all MSAs. So, elasticity at mean with respect to 1979
employment is given by deviation coefficient. Region dummies are constrained so that their weighted sum,
using number of MSAs in each region as weight, is zero. As discussed by Kennedy (1986), this implies that
each region coefficient is the difference of that region from the national average.
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have a greater tendency to lose manufacturing and decentralize, as well as a greater tendency
to lose industries that employ a great many blacks. The regional pattern is somewhat more
complicated. Generally, there was more growth in Sunbelt states, with the exception of
some of the "Oil Patch" states in the Southwest. Deindustrialization was particularly
pronounced in the Northeast, but New England MSAs were able to keep their wage premium
relatively stable. The Midwestern MSAs did not lose as much manufacturing share as the
national average but tended to lose high wage premium industries.
Finally, I examined how the economic development variables changed in MSAs with
relatively large black populations, compared to other MSAs. Table 9 reports the weighted
average changes for all MSAs, from 1973 to 1979 and from 1979 to 1989, in various
economic development variables, using as weights the black population shares in each MS A,
or the white population shares in MSAs. The most noticeable difference is that blacks tended
to be concentrated in MSAs that exhibited relatively slow employment growth. This black
concentration in slow-growth MSAs was especially pronounced in the 1973-79 period. This
pattern of black concentration in slow growth metropolitan areas was previously noted by
Frey and Speare (1988) and Moore and Laramore (1990).

V.

Effects of MSA Growth on Black and White Economic Success
I now present estimates of the effects of changes in MSA economic development

variables on changes in black and white economic outcomes. As a reminder, the dependent
variables in this study are various types of year to year changes in MSA mean economic
outcomes—such as the year to year change in real personal earnings—for different

Table 9
Comparison of Average Change Across All MSAs
in Selected Economic Development Variables,
Using Black or White Population Weights

1973-79

1979-89

Black
Weights

White
Weights

Black
Weights

White
Weights

12.7%

15.8%

21.1%

22.4%

Change in Percentage
Wage Premium

NA

NA

-1.5%

-1.5%

Change in Educational
Requirements

NA

NA

+ .070
years

+ .067
years

% Change in Black
Share of Employment
Demand

NA

NA

-1.0%

-0.7%

% Change in
Female Share

NA

NA

+3.7%

+3.9%

% Change in
Youth Share

NA

NA

+2.5

+2.7%

% Employment Growth

Notes: All numbers are based on 314 MSAs. Weights used are sum of black or white March 1990 CPS
weights for each MSA.
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demographic groups. These MSA mean economic outcomes are "regression-adjusted"
means: the means control education, experience, and other personal characteristics so that
we are comparing average economic outcomes over time and from one MSA to another for
persons with the same characteristics. The independent variables include time dummies, and
year to year changes in various MSA characteristics. These changes in MSA characteristics
include MSA employment growth, changes in MSA industrial mix, and changes in MSA
decentralization. All of these changes in MSA characteristics can be considered to be
changes in MSA economic development, broadly defined: an MSA economic development
policy that aids particular firms will have as its immediate goal affecting the growth of the
MSA, the types of industries in the MSA, or the spatial distribution of industries in the
MSA. In addition to including current values of these changes in MSA economic
development variables as independent variables, some specifications also include as
independent variables some lagged values of changes in economic development variables.
The present section, section V, begins with models in which the only economic
development variable among the independent variables is MSA employment growth. All
models include the time dummies. Section VI will present slightly more complex models
that also include as independent variables various types of MSA industrial mix variables, in
addition to MSA employment growth and the time dummies. Section VII will present even
more complex models that also include as an independent variable the decentralization
variable, in addition to MSA employment growth, an MSA industrial mix variable, and the
time dummies.
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Several rationales can be offered for this estimation strategy of starting with simple
models before adding in more economic development variables. First, there are many
changes in MSA economic development variables that are potential independent variables.
Including all or even most of these variables in a model results in multicollinearity and
imprecise estimates. Being selective in what variables to include is essential to obtain
meaningful results. Second, as argued in section III, the MSA decentralization variable is a
crude measure of MSA job access or the within-MSA spatial distribution of industry. The
crudeness of this variable justifies initially excluding it from the estimated models. Third,
more time periods of data are available for the MSA employment growth variable than for
the MSA industrial mix variables. Data on employment growth are available back to 196970. Data on changes in MSA industrial mix are available back to 1975-76. 14 Models that
only include MSA employment growth and time dummies as independent variables can be
estimated using a larger sample than models that also include MSA industrial mix variables.
Fourth, I would argue that local employment growth is the most important goal of most
economic development policy makers. A change in MSA industrial mix is only sometimes a
secondary goal. Policy makers might be interested in knowing the effects of MSA
employment growth, without control of changes in MSA industrial mix. Such estimates are
obtained in the present section.

14 The technical appendix gives more information on how these data are derived and the
sources of these limitations.
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Estimated Long-Run Effects of MSA Growth on Black and White Personal Earnings
Figure 7 reports estimated long-run effects of a 1 percent once-and-for-all increase in
MSA employment (compared to what it otherwise would have been) on black and white real
personal earnings. The model on which these estimates are based has as a dependent
variable the year to year change in average black (or white) real personal earnings in the
MSA. This MSA average controls education, experience, and other personal characteristics.
The figure 7 estimates are for a model in which the only independent variable, other than
time dummies, is the current year-to-year employment growth of the MSA. For blacks, this
"zero-lag" model is preferred applying Schwartz's Bayesian Criterion to 10 alternative
models that include various lag lengths in MSA employment growth. These 10 alternative
models also include, in addition to time dummies and current growth, from one to ten lags in
MSA employment growth. For example, the 2-lag model includes as independent variables
the time dummies, current employment growth, once-lagged employment growth, and twicelagged employment growth. For whites, the "once-lagged" model is preferred by the
Schwartz' Bayesian criterion. But figure 7 reports the zero-lag model for whites to make the
results comparable to those for blacks. The sensitivity of results to alternative lag lengths
will be considered further below.
As shown in figure 7, a 1 percent increase in MSA employment is estimated to
increase black real personal earnings by about 8/10ths of 1 percent and white real personal
earnings by about 5/10ths of 1 percent. The difference between these effects for blacks and
whites has a t-statistic value of 1.61. The probability of such a t-value occurring by chance,
when there is no true difference between effects on blacks and whites, is .107.

Figure 7: Long Run Effects of a 1 Percent Increase in MSA Employment
on Black and White Regression Adjusted Real Personal Earnings
Zero-Lag Specification
Percent Effects on Adjusted Real Personal Earnings
1.0
.837%
(.185)

.496%
(.074)

0.5

0.0

Blacks

Whites

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Both coefficients are clearly statistically significant at all conventional
significance levels. Reported percent effect is coefficient on the percentage change in MSA employment in equations with
percentage change in real personal earnings of blacks or whites as dependent variables. Both equations include tune
dummies. Estimates span 1973-74 to 1988-89, and include 1234 observations for blacks and 1432 observations for whites.
As discussed in technical appendix, all estimates correct for heteroskedasticity and serial corrrelatioiL Zero-lag
specification is optimal lag length for black model, based on Schwartz'sBayesian Criterion (SBC). One-lag
specification is optimal for whites. For both blacks and whites, lag lengths from 0 to 10 years were tested. Long-run
growth effect on white personal earnings is .477(.096) in one-lag specification.
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Figure 8 shows alternative estimates of these "long-run" growth effects in a 10-lag
specification. Long-run effects do tend to decline somewhat in a 10-lag specification, to
perhaps half the estimated long-run effects in the zero-lag, specification. But growth effects
on both black and white real earnings are still statistically significant for at least nine years
after the employment change, and there is still some tendency for growth effects on black
real earnings to exceed those on white real earnings.
Figure 9 shows how MSA growth affects the various determinants of earnings. The
figure allows an evaluation of the relative contribution of these determinants to growth's
effect on earnings. Personal earnings is the product of annual weeks worked and average
earnings per week. Therefore, the percentage effect of growth on earnings will
approximately equal the sum of (a) the percentage effect of growth on annual weeks worked
and (b) the percentage effect of growth on average earnings per week. In turn, the
percentage effect of growth on annual weeks worked will approximately equal the sum of (a)
the percentage effect of growth on annual weeks in the labor force and (b) the percentage
effect of growth on the ratio of weeks employed to weeks in the labor force. Also, the
percentage effect of growth on earnings per week is approximately the sum of (a) the
percentage effect of growth on earnings per hour and (b) the percentage effect of growth on
hours per week. The purpose of this decomposition is to get some idea of whether growth
affects earnings by increasing work or increasing pay. Increasing work increases the size of

Figure 8
Comparison of Alternative Estimates
of "Long-Run" Effects of a 1 % Increase
in MSA Employment on Black and White
Regression-Adjusted Real Personal Earnings

1.6

1.370%
-C.454X .

1.4

1.2

.837%
(.185)
0.8

,4965.
(.074)

0.6

0.4

0.2

Zero-lag
10-lag
Cumulative effect
Specification Specification after Last Significant
Lag in 10-lag
Specification
I________________(9 years)
|

Blacks

Zero-lag
10-lag
Cumulative effect
Specification Specification after Last Significant
Lag in 10-lag
Specification
______
(10 years)
I

Whites

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All effects except 10-lag effect
for blacks are statistically significant at all conventional significance
levels. 10-lag specification, in addition to having more lags, has fewer
observations because observations can only start with 1979-80 as
BEA's MSA employment data starts in 1969. Number of observations in 10-lag
specification is 1002 for blacks and 1200 for whites. All models also
include time dummies.

Figure 9

A Decomposition of the Estimated Effects of
a 1 % Increase in MSA Employment on Personal Earnings
Into Its Effects on Components of Earnings

Whites

Blacks
% Effect on Weeks
in Labor Force .110%***.
(.046)

% Effect on Weeks
in Labor Force .372 % ***.
(.135)

% Effect on
Annual Weeks
Employed

% Effect on
Annual Weeks
Employed
% Effect on Weeks
Employed/Weeks in
294 % ***
Labor Force
(.084)

.837%***
% Effect on
Annual Earnings(.185)

.095%*
% Effect on
Hours Per Week (.063)
% Effect on
Weekly Earnings

.065%
% Effect on
Earnings Per Hour (.297)

.116%
(.174)

% Effect on Weeks
Employed/Weeks in
135 % ***"
Labor Force
(.018)

.248%***
(.049)

.496%***
% Effect on
Annual Earnings(.074)

.067%***
% Effect on
Hours Per Week (.028)
% Effect on
Weekly Earnings

.255%***
(.065)

.195%***
% Effect on
Earnings Per Hour (.067)

Notes: All estimates come from zero-lag specifications with different
percentage change dependent variables, and same independent variables
(time dummies and percentage change in MSA employment).
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at 15%, 10% and 5% level for 2-tail test. Note that summations of
percentage effects only approximately hold. Number of MSA-year
observations is 1234 for blacks, 1432 for whites.
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the market economy; increasing pay transfers resources from employers to employees. 15
Although earnings per hour is in the abstract the best measure of pay, this variable is quite
imprecisely measured in the CPS: the CPS only has a rough measure of average weekly
hours worked. Hence, earnings per week is a useful alternative measure of average pay.
The decomposition in figure 9 suggests that most of growth's effects on black
personal earnings are due to effects on work-related activities—labor force participation and
unemployment—rather than effects on pay levels. 16 There is some uncertainty about
estimated growth effects on black pay levels, but it is highly unlikely the effects on black pay
levels are as great as effects on black work activity. For whites, effects of growth on
personal earnings are about half due to effects on work activity and half due to effects on pay
rates. Growth helps blacks get into the labor market. Growth does that for whites too, but
apparently also helps whites move up to higher paying jobs.

Consequences for Poverty Rates of Growth's Effects on Personal Earnings
Figure 10 shows the effects of growth on black and white poverty rates. The effect
of growth on black poverty rates is over four times as great as the effect of growth on white

15 In turn, increasing pay may result in increasing prices, transferring resources from
consumers to businesses. The point remains that wage increases by themselves simply lead to
some redivision of the total economic pie. The exact redivision depends on what happens to
consumer prices, but it still just a redivision of the same pie. Increases in labor force
participation or employment rates can expand the size of the economic pie.
16 Note that this conclusion differs somewhat from Bartik (1991), which concluded that
most of the black/white differences in growth effects on earnings were due to differential
effects of growth on promotion to higher paying jobs. The reasons for the different
conclusions in the two studies are unclear.

Figure 10: Estimated Long Run Reduction in Black and White Poverty Rate
Due to 1 Percent Increase in MS A Employment, Zero-Lag Specification
Reduction in Poverty Rate (in Rate Points)
0.5

0.4

0.398
(.105)

0.3

0.2

0.072
(.024)

0.1

0.0

Blacks

Whites

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Both coefficients are clearly statistically significant at all conventional
significance levels. " .398" coefficient is interpreted as implying (hat a 1 percent increase in MSA employment, in an MSA
wiui 30 percent black poverty rate, would lower rate to about 29.6 percent. Estimates are based on 1234 MSA-time period
observations for blacks, and 1432 MSA-time period observations for whites. Zero-lag specification is optimal according to
SBC for both blacks and whites.
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poverty rates. The black-white difference is highly significant statistically (probability =
.004). The greater effect of growth on black poverty rates compared to white poverty rates
in part reflects the greater effects of growth on black personal earnings vis-a-vis white
personal earnings. But the greater effect also reflects higher black poverty rates and
generally lower black personal earnings. With more blacks than whites close to the poverty
line, a given increase in personal earnings for blacks will tend to have greater effects on
poverty rates than a similar increase in earnings for whites.

Effects of Growth on the Earnings of Various Subgroups of Blacks and Whites
Figures 11, 12, and 13 present the estimated effects of growth on various subgroups
of blacks and whites, differentiated by education, age, and gender. In general, effects of
growth do not differ much among different groups of blacks. But growth effects for whites
are stronger for high school dropouts than for completers, and stronger for youths than for
prime-age and older persons. The black-white differential in growth effects is most
statistically significant for high school completers, prime-age persons, and females. In all
these cases growth effects for blacks are stronger than for whites.
One interpretation of these findings is that growth most strongly affects groups with
the weakest position in the labor market, such as high school dropouts, youths, and blacks.
These marginal groups are most dependent on a tight local economy to allow them to get
better jobs or indeed any jobs at all.

Figure 11
Estimated Long-Run Percentage Effects
on Real Personal Earnings of 1 % Increase
in MSA Employment, Blacks and Whites
Differentiated by Education
1.2
1.002%
(.485)
.827%
(.248)
.737%

0.8

0.6

.374%
(.079)

0.4

0.2

0
Black HS Dropouts

White HS Dropouts

Black HS Completers

White HS Completers

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All effects are statistically
significant at 5% level, 2-tail test, t -stats on selected comparisons
have following probabilities of occurring by chance if true difference
is zero: BDvs. BC: .744; WD vs. WC: .083; BD vs. WD: .859;
BC vs. WC: .047. All models also include time dummies. Number of
observations for different groups is as follows: BD, 1023; WD, 1432;
BC, 1175; WC, 1432. Results reported are for zero-lag specifications.
Zero-lag is optimal specification, according to SBC, among lag lengths
from 0 to 10 years, for all groups except white completers, for whom
optimal SBC lag length is one. One-lag estimates of LR growth effects
for white completers is .348 (.100).

Figure 12
Estimated Long-Run Percentage Effects
on Real Personal Earnings of 1 % Increase
in MSA Employment, Blacks and Whites
Differentiated by Age
1.4
1.199%
(.509)
1.2

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

16-24

25-54

GE55

Blacks H Whites

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All effects except for B55 group
?-stats on selected
are statistically significant at 5% level, 2-tail test.
comparisons have the following probabilities of occurring by chance when the
true difference is zero: B16 vs. B25: .668; B25 vs. B55: .864; W16 vs. W25:
.157; W25 vs. W55: .796; B16 vs. W16: .800; B25 vs. W25: .075; B55 vs. W55:
.827. All models also include time dummies. Number of observations for
different groups is: B16, 1011; W16, 1432; B25, 1193; W25, 1432; B55, 982;
W55, 1432. Reported estimates are for zero-lag specification. Zero-lag is
optimal lag length according to SBC, among all lag lengths from 0 to 10 years,
for all groups except whites 25-54 (W25), for whom one lag is optimal SBC lag
length. For W25 group, LR growth effect in 1-lag specification is .357 (.119).

Figure 13: Estimated Long Run Effects of 1 Percent Increase in MSA Employment
on Real Personal Earnings, Blacks and Whites Differentiated by Gender
Percent Effect on Real Personal Earnings
1.0
0.9
0.8

.833 %
(.265)

.777 %
(.243)

0.7
0.6

.513%
(.087)

0.5
.367%
(.117)

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Black
Males

White
Males

Black
Females

White
Females

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All effects are statistically significant at 5% level, 2-tail test. 7-stats
on selected comparisons have following probabilities: black males vs. black females: .864; white males vs. white
females: .356; black males vs. white males: .419; black females vs. white females: .133. Estimates are based on
following number of MSA-year observations: black males — 1166; white males — 1432; black females — 1192;
white females — 1432. Zero-lag specification is optimal lag length, among lag lengths from 0 to 10 years, for all
these groups except white males. For white males, a lag length of one is optimal. Estimated long-run effect
of growth on white male earnings in one-lag specification is .464 (.112). All estimated models include time dummies.
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Effects of Evening Out Growth
As pointed out above, the average black, compared to the average white, tends to live
in MS As with slower employment growth. Table 10 uses the estimated earnings effects of
growth to calculate how much more black personal earnings would have increased from 1973
to 1989 if blacks had lived in MSAs with the same average growth as whites. This
hypothetical change could have occurred either through increased job growth in MSAs with a
large black percentage (bringing jobs to people) or through migration of blacks to MSAs like
those of whites (bringing people to jobs).
Table 10 shows that evening out MSA growth among blacks and whites over the
1973-89 period would have increased the earnings of different black groups by 3 to 7
percent, or by 0.2 percent to 0.4 percent per year. This increase is large enough to be
important, but not large enough to explain all of the trends in black economic status. As
table 10 shows, the different MSA economic trends faced by blacks and whites can explain a
considerable portion, but not all, of the widening black-white earnings differentials in various
subgroups. 17

Also, it should be noted that these long-run effects of evening out growth might be cut
in half if we relied on point estimates from a 10-lag specification rather than a zero-lag
specification (e.g., Figure 8). However, 10-lag specification estimates are not precise enough
to rule out the estimated effects presented in Table 10.
17

Table 10
Effects on Black Earnings of "Evening Out" MS A Growth,
Compared With the Actual Percentage Change in Black/White Earnings Ratios

Simulated Percentage Effect on
Black Earnings of "Evening Out"
MSA Growth, 1973-89

Actual Percentage Change in
Ratio of Black to
White Earnings, 1973-89

All Blacks 16 and over

4.8%

-2.6%

High School Dropouts
High School Completers

5.7%
4.7%

-15.6%
-1.7%

Youth 16-24
Prime Age 25-54
Older GE 55

6.8%
4.6 %
3.4%

-11.9%
-5.8 %
-13.3%

Males
Females

4.4%
4.7%

-10.2%
-10.7%

Notes: Percentage effects of evening out growth calculated using differences in white versus black 1973
population-weighted growth for 33 MSAs from 1973 to 1989. The white-weighted percentage change in MSA
employment from 1973-89 exceeds the black-weighted change by 5.7%, slightly greater than the weighted
growth differentials reported for 314 MSAs in Table 9. Calculations also use estimated growth effects for black
sub-groups from Figures 7, 11, 12, and 13. Percentage change in ratio of black to white earnings calculated
based on table 5.

71
VI.

Effects of Changes in MSA Industrial Mix on Black and White Economic Success

Strategy for Estimating the Effects of MSA Industrial Mix
As a reminder, the dependent variables in this study are the year to year change in the
average MSA economic outcome for various demographic groups. Most of the text
discussion and tables focus on one particularly important economic outcome variable, the
year-to-year change in average MSA real personal earnings per capita for a demographic
group. The models in this section continue to include as independent variables time dummies
and metropolitan employment growth. Also, the models in this section do not include a
metropolitan decentralization variable; models including a metropolitan decentralization
variable are considered in section VII. The models in this section do add in as independent
variables different variables that depend on changes in the MSA's industrial mix.
Simultaneously including as independent variables all the industrial mix variables
would lead to multicollinearity problems and imprecise estimates. My alternative strategy is
to add in the industrial mix variables as independent variables one at a time. Industrial mix
variables that are significant are kept in subsequent models that include additional industrial
mix variables; industrial mix variables that are statistically insignificant are dropped. All
models also include time dummies and MSA employment growth.
I begin this alternative modelling strategy by including as an independent variable the
change in the share of MSA jobs in manufacturing. Declining manufacturing is one of the
more popular explanations for black poverty problems. To anticipate the results below, this
variable has the expected effects at a statistically significant level only for some groups. I
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then try an alternative industrial mix variable that I believe is theoretically superior to the
manufacturing share variable: the change in the average MSA wage premium due to
changing industrial mix. This wage premium variable attempts to capture how MSA wages
will change due to increases or decreases in industries that pay well relative to the credentials
of their workers. I would argue that this wage premium variable better measures the main
reason why the MSA's manufacturing share is argued to be important: MSA manufacturing
share reflects how many MSA jobs are "good jobs." Again anticipating results, this wage
premium variable appears to statistically dominate the manufacturing share variable.
I then add in separately, as independent variables, other industrial mix variables, to a
model that already includes as independent variables the time dummies, MSA employment
growth, and the wage premium variable. I first add in as an independent variable the change
in the share of MSA labor demand for a particular demographic group due to changes in
MSA industrial mix. I then drop this demographic share variable, and add in as an
independent variable the change in the years of education demanded by an MSA's employers
due to changes in the MSA's industrial mix. As the results will show, these demographic
share and education demand variables are generally not statistically significant.
At each stage of this estimation search strategy, I considered alternative lag lengths in
the economic development variables: the metropolitan employment growth variable and the
various industrial mix variables. I considered models with five different lag lengths, from
zero lags up to four lags. A zero lag model, for example, would include current year to
year MSA employment growth and the current year-to-year change in whatever industrial
mix variables were included in a particular specification. A two lag model would include
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current MSA employment growth and current change in the MSA industrial mix variables,
once-lagged employment growth and once-lagged industrial mix variables, and twice-lagged
employment growth and twice-lagged industrial mix variables. Only a maximum of four lags
were considered, because the industrial mix variables are only measured starting with the
1975-76 time period. In general, zero lag models—models with only current values of
employment growth and industrial mix variables—were preferred to longer lag lengths by
Schwartz's Bayesian Criterion for most of the specifications considered. Exceptions will be
noted in the tables.

Effects of Alternative Measures of Industrial Mix on Real Personal Earnings
Table 11 presents the estimated effects of changes in the MSA manufacturing share on
the real earnings of various groups of blacks and whites. As a reminder, this model also
includes as independent variables the time dummies and MSA employment growth.
Decreases in the MSA manufacturing share do not have significant negative effects on blacks
overall or whites overall. Decreases in the MSA manufacturing share do have significant
negative effects on three important groups: white high school dropouts, black high school
completers, and black prime-age persons. 18 The estimates suggests that declining
manufacturing generally has more negative effects on a black group than on a comparable
white group.

18 "Significance" here means that the probability is less than .15 for a two-tail test, or a
/-statistic greater than around 1.44 in absolute value.

Table 11
Effects of MSA Growth and Change in MS A
Manufacturing Share on Adjusted Real Personal Earnings
of Various Black and White Groups
% Effect on Earnings
of 1 % Increase in
MSA Employment
Blacks
Whites

% Effect on Earnings
of 1 Point Increase
in Manufacturing Share

.715*"
.535***

(.212)
(.083)

1.085
-.381

(.926)
(.358)

1.237*"
.582***
.623***
.427***

(.557)
(.180)
(.285)
(.088)

-2.054
1.674***
1.803*
-.502

(2.389)
(.805)
(1.241)
(.376)

Black 16-24
White 16-24
Black 25-54
White 25-54
Black GE 55
White GE 55

.902*
.796*"
.624***
.520*"
.983*
.554***

(.587)
(.201)
(.262)
(.101)
(.680)
(.230)

2.637
-.046
2.038**
-.255
-3.137
-.116

(2.604)
(.890)
(1.146)
(.437)
(2.892)
(.981)

Black Male
White Male
Black Female
White Female

.635***
.531*"
.790*"
.461*"

(.278)
(.097)
(.304)
(.130)

1.264
-.174
.376
-.937**

(1.219)
(.417)
(1.316)
(.567)

Black Dropouts
White Dropouts
Black Completers
White Completes

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 15%, 10%,
and 5% level, 2-tail test. Estimated effects again come from specifications with controls for national time
period effects. Estimation period runs from 1973-74 to 1988-89. Number of observations by group is same as
reported in Figure 7, and Figures 11-13. All reported estimates are for zero-lag specification. Zero-lags is
optimal specification according to SBC, among all specifications from 0 to 10 years, for all groups except:
White Males (WM); Whites 25-54 (W25). For these groups, the optimal lag length is one year. LR effects of
growth and manufacturing on earnings for these two groups, in a one-lag specification, is as follows:
WM: growth .497 (.127); manuf. -.452 (.519); W25: growth .413 (.134); manuf. -.695 (.551).
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Table 12 presents the effects on real earnings of changes in an alternative measure of
MS A industrial mix, the average wage premium. The table 12 results are for a specification
that includes as independent variables the time dummies, MSA employment growth, and the
wage premium variable, but not the manufacturing share variable. The wage premium
variable has more statistically significant effects in table 12 than the manufacturing share
variable had in table 11. Declines in the average wage premium in an MSA lead to
significant declines in the real personal earnings of blacks overall, whites overall, white
dropouts, black high school completers, white youths, black prime-age persons, black males,
black females, and white females. 19 When both the wage premium and the manufacturing
variable are included in the estimation (table 13), the manufacturing variable is never
significantly positive for any group. In addition, the estimated effects of the wage premium
variable are usually not much affected by the inclusion of the manufacturing share variable.
Thus, the wage premium variable seems to dominate the manufacturing variable as a measure
of industrial mix.
Table 14 reports estimated effects on real earnings from a model that adds as an
independent variable the change in the share of MSA labor demand for the relevant
demographic group due to changes in the MSA's industrial mix. For each demographic
group, one demographic variable is added to the model. This demographic variable
measures demand change for the demographic group whose change in real earnings is being
used as the dependent variable. Each estimating equation also includes as independent
variables the time dummies, MSA employment growth, and the MSA wage premium

19

Again, "significance" here is a probability of less than .15 for a 2-tail test.

Table 12
Effects of MS A Growth and Changes in
Average Industry Wage Premium on the
MSA
the
Adjusted Real Personal Earnings of Various
Black and White Groups

Blacks
Whites

% Effect on Earnings of
1 % Increase in MSA Employment
.547***
(.252)
.377***
(.098)

% Effect on Earnings of
1 % Increase in MSA's Wage Premium
6.202***
(2.785)
2.221***
(1.105)

.720
.289
.470
.329***

(.651)
(.215)
(.336)
(.104)

2.182
8.550***
6.973**

Black 16-24
White 16-24
Black 25-54
White 25-54
Black GE-55
White GE-55

1.011
.552***
.571**
.392***

(.713)
(.239)
(.310)
(.120)
(.804)
(.267)

5.677
5.786***
6.244**

Black Male
White Male
Black Female
White Female

.414
.461***

Black Dropouts
White Dropouts
Black Completers
White Completers

-.320
.365

.570*
.164

(.331)
(.115)
(.365)
(.154)

.764

1.819
12.160
3.902
6.272**
1.583
6.973**
2.959**

(7.084)
(2.503)
(3.699)
(1.157)
(8.063)
(2.762)
(3.437)
(1.355)
(8.645)
(2.985)
(3.653)
(1.285)
(4.013)
(1.765)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 15%, 10%, and 5%
levels, 2-tail test. All models also include time dummies. Estimation period runs from 1975-76 to 1988-89.
Number of observations by group is as follows: 1365 for all white groups; B, 1167; BD, 960; BC, 1109; B16,
946; B25, 1126; B55, 920; BM, 1099; BF, 1125. Zero lag length is optimal lag length according to SBC, for
all lag lengths from 0 to 4 years, for all groups except white drop-outs, white completers, white adults, and
white males. For these groups, optimal lag length is one year. LR effects of MSA growth for these four
groups in one lag specification are: WD, .236 (.270); WC, .243 (.131); W25, .143 (.156); WM, .224 (.146).
LR effects of wage premium of these groups in one lag specification are: WD, 10.162 (2.874); WC, 1.669
(1.455); W25, 3.568 (1.745); WM, 4.000 (1.625).

Table 13
Effects of MSA Growth, Changes in the MSA Manufacturing Share,
and Changes in the MSA Wage Premium on the Adjusted Real
Personal Earnings of Various Black and White Groups

Effect on Earnings of
1% Increase in
MSA Employment

Effect on Earnings of
1 Point Increase in
Manufacturing Share

Blacks
Whites

.541***
.401***

(.253)
(.098)

.292
-1.004***

(1.213)
(.442)

5.771***
3.756***

(3.455)
(1.292)

Black Dropouts
White Dropouts
Black Completers
White Completers

.772
.281
.457
.355***

(.654)
(.216)
(.338)
(.104)

-2.736
.401
.612
-.974***

(3.146)
(.990)
(1.598)
(.465)

6.802
7.952***
5.971
2.247**

(8.846)
(2.906)
(4.532)
(1.354)

Black 16-24
White 16-24
Black 25-54
White 25-54
Black GE-55
White GE-55

.951
.569***
.545**
.414***
-.153
.380

(.715)
(.240)
(.311)
(.121)
(.807)
(.270)

3.949
-.733
1.443
-1.023***
-7.628***
-.513

(3.444)
(1.097)
(1.498)
(.541)
(3.773)
(1.215)

-1.169
6.926***
3.845
3.382***
25.001***
4.670

(10.035)
(3.247)
(4.246)
(1.583)
(10.719)
(3.496)

Black Male
White Male
Black Female
White Female

.403
.476***
.586*
.210

(.332)
(.115)
(.366)
(.154)

.656
-.609
-.840
-1.910***

(1.591)
(.518)
(1.747)
(.698)

5.177
2.509**
8.385**
5.879***

(4.522)
(1.508)
(4.974)
(2.054)

% Effect on Earnings of
1 % Increase in MSA's
Wage Premium

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 15%, 10%, and 5% levels for a
2-tail test. All models also include time dummies. All estimates are for a zero-lag specification. The estimation period
is 1975-76 to 1988-89. The number of observations by group is identical to those given in the notes to Table 12.

Table 14
Effects of Shifts in the MSA Industry Mix
Toward a Group on Adjusted Real Personal
Earnings of That Group

Blacks

Whites

Overall

-1.485
(1.380)

11.482***
(3.862)

Dropouts

-2.488
(2.321)

0.162
(0.753)

Completers

-0.458
(1.458)

2.732
(1.906)

Ages 16-24

0.809
(3.304)

2.497**
(1.419)

Ages 25-54

-0.166
(1.518)

6.769***
(2.649)

Ages GE 55

2.290
(2.143)

-0.656
(1.895)

Males

1.740
(1.289)

2.523***
(0.605)

Females

-1.184
(1.215)

-2.149***
(0.755)

Notes: Reported effects are percentage effects on earnings of a percentage change in predicted share of a
group—based on MSA industry mix—in total employment demand (e.g., shift from 10% share of employment
for blacks to 11 percent is 10% increase). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at 15%, 10%, and 5% levels using a two-tail test. All estimates also control MSA
growth, MSA wage premium, and time dummies. Estimation period runs from 1975-76 to 1988-89. Number
of observations by group is identical to those given in Table 12. All estimates are for zero-lag specifications.
Zero-lag specification is optimal specification according to SBC, among lag lengths from 0 to 4 years, for all
groups.
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variable. For the various black groups, there is no sign that shifts in the MSA industrial mix
towards industries that demand large proportions of that particular black group has significant
positive effects. The demographic share variables do have significantly positive effects for
some white groups. But the pattern of the coefficients suggests that these white demographic
variables are probably proxies for some unobserved variables that favorably affect industrial
mix. For example, the white demographic share and black demographic share variables are
almost perfectly negatively correlated. If one properly adjusts these variables for differences
in how they are defined, a shift towards a "white" demographic structure has approximately
the same magnitude positive effect on earnings for both blacks and whites.20
Table 15 drops the demographic share variable, and adds in the education variable.
This education variable measures the change in education demand in the MSA due to changes
in the MSA's industrial mix. The models in table 15 continue to include as independent
variables the time dummies, MSA employment growth, and the MSA wage premium
variable. The education variable does not perform well. Increased education demand does
not appear to hurt the low-education dropout groups. Increased education demand is
estimated to adversely affect younger persons. But the regression adjustment procedure at
least in theory calculates the predicted real earnings of younger persons having the same

20 The black and white demographic share variables are the logged shares of these
groups. Suppose that a shift in the unlogged white share (WS) has the same effect on the
black and white earnings variables (BE and WE), or dBE/dWS=dWE/dWS=some constant
k. Now by the definition of the unlogged black share variable (BS), dBS approximately
equals -dWS. So dBE/dBS=-k. But the variables actually used in the regression are the
logged shares. Under these assumptions, dBE/dln(BS)=-k*BS =-k(.107) at the mean of BS,
and dWE/dln(WS)=k*WS=k(.860) at the mean of WS. Hence the ratio of the logged white
demographic share variable's coefficient to the black coefficient should be .860/(-.107) =
-8.04. The observed ratio in Table 14 is 11.482/(-l.485)=-7.73.

Table 15
Effects on Real Earnings
of Shifts in An MSA's Industrial Mix
Towards Higher Education Industries

Blacks

Whites

Overall

-0.347
(0.569)

-0.144
(0.225)

Dropouts

0.772
(1.468)

-0.192
(0.500)

Completers

-0.026
(0.745)

-0.036
(0.236)

Ages 16-24

-3.453~*
(1.631)

-1.072**
(0.573)

Ages 25-54

-0.367
(0.701)

-0.163
(0.275)

Ages GE 55

1.341
(1.766)

0.084
(0.606)

Males

-0.525
(0.743)

-0.153
(0.262)

Females

-0.155
(0.817)

-0.239
(0.359)

Notes: Reported effects show proportional effects on real earnings of 1 year increase in educational
requirements, based on industry mix. For example, coefficient of -0.347 for all blacks means that 1-year
increase in educational requirements—an enormous change—would reduce black earnings by 34.7%. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 15%, 10%, and 5% levels for a
two-tail test. All specifications also control MSA growth, the change in wage premium variable, and the time
dummies. Estimation period runs from 1975-76 to 1988-89. Number of observations by group is given in
Table 12. All reported estimates are for zero-lag specifications. Zero-lag is optimal specification according to
SBC, among all lag lengths from 0 to 4 years, for all groups except white males. For white males, optimal lag
length is one year. Long-run effect of education on white male earning in one lag specification is .207 (.326).
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education as prime-age and older persons. It is unclear why increased education demand
should have more negative effects on younger persons than prime-age and older persons after
this adjustment.
Overall, these results are most consistent with the view that the most important MS A
industrial mix variable for black and white economic success is the average MSA wage
premium. Changes in MSA education demand, whether measured by changes in the share of
demand for high school dropouts or changes in average education levels of the typical MSA
industry, do not have the predicted adverse effects on low education groups.
The lack of effects of these education demand measures at the MSA level need not
imply that changing education demand has zero effects at the national level. The measures
of education demand mix used here are quite imperfect. Several researchers have argued
that educational requirements are increasing primarily because of changes within industries,
not because of changes in industry mix (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Bound and Johnson, 1992).
In addition, increases in education demand at the MSA level may be more easily
accommodated by in-migration of educated workers, the most mobile population group. For
both these reasons, the effects of national education demand increases could be greater than
the effects of this report's MSA education demand variables.
The earnings effects of the MSA wage premium could plausibly reflect the wage
premium's effects on both local wages and local labor supply. As shown in table 12, the
effect of reductions in the industry wage premium is more than 1-to-l: a 1 percent reduction
in the industry wage premium reduces white personal earnings by 2.2 percent and black
personal earnings by 6.2 percent. A 1 percent reduction in the MSA wage premium would

82
have exactly a 1 to 1 effect on earnings if each industry in the MSA paid the same as the
national average and persons' labor supplies were unaffected by a shift away from high wage
industries. But it is plausible that a shift away from high-wage industries in an MSA will
tend to reduce the average industry's wages in that MSA relative to its national counterpart.
Also, a shift away from high wage industries may tend to reduce labor force participation.
For both these reasons—reductions in relative MSA industry wages and reduced labor
supply—a percent reduction in the MSA wage premium might be expected to reduce average
MSA earnings by more than 1 percent. These hypotheses will be explored further below.
But of course these large industry wage premium effects may also occur because the wage
premium variable may be a proxy for other influences of MSA industry mix. As has been
shown by Dickens and Katz (1987), many industry characteristics—unionization for
example—are highly correlated with the industry wage premium. It is hard to distinguish
between hypotheses involving these highly correlated industry characteristics.

Further Exploration of the Effects of the MSA Industry Wage Premium on Personal Earnings
I now further explore how the average MSA industry wage premium affects black and
white earnings, and the consequences and implications of these effects of average MSA wage
premiums. To begin, figure 14 provides a decomposition of the effects of the industry wage
premium on overall black and white personal earnings into its effects on various determinants
of earnings. Wage premium effects for blacks are due more to wages going up than to work
activity going up. Wage premium effects for whites are due somewhat more to work activity
going up than to wages going up. One plausible interpretation of these black-white

Figure 14

A Decomposition of How Changes
in the MSA Wage Premium Affect Real Earnings

Blacks

Whites

% Effect on Annual Weeks
in Labor Force 2.012
(2.035)

% Effect on Annual Weeks
in Labor Force .420
(.686)
% Effect on
Annual Weeks
Employed

% Effect on Weeks
Employed/Weeks in
Labor Force
_j 094
(L287)

% Effect on
Real Earnings

1.975***
% Effect on
Hours Per Week (.904)
% Effect on
Earnings Per Week

% Effect on
4.821
Earnings Per Hour (4.322)

% Effect on
Annual Weeks
Employed

,«
(2.252)

6.498***

6.202***
(2.785)

% Effect on Weeks
Employed/Weeks in
Labor Force
i 048***
(.269)

% Effect on
.295
Hours Per Week (.387)

„„«,***
}•»***
<•

% Effect on
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.913
%
/u J_>11«^VI.
Effect »J11
on
f ns:n\
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% Effect on
.585
Earnings Per Hour (.926)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at 15%, 10%, and 5% levels for a 2-tail test. Note that the
various percentage effects only approximately add up. These results are based
on specifications that control MSA growth and time dummies. Also, all results
are for zero-lag specifications. The MSA growth decomposition from these
specifications are quite similar to what was previously presented for
specifications without the wage premium variable.

2.221***
(1.105)
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differences is that blacks have more difficulty than whites in getting access to high-wage
premium industries but that racial wage differentials are narrower within such industries.
Figure 15 reports the poverty consequences of changes in the average MS A wage
premium. The MS A wage premium does not have statistically significant effects on poverty
for blacks or whites, and for whites the estimated effect has an unexpected sign. One
plausible interpretation of these results is that persons on the margin of poverty do not have
access to high wage premium jobs, so the anti-poverty effect of shifts towards or away from
high wage industries is limited.
What are the policy implications of these estimated MSA industry wage premium
effects? It might appear that increasing the MSA wage premium is a more attractive option
than increasing MSA employment for state and local policymakers. As shown in table 13,
for many groups a 1 percent increase in the industry wage premium has a much greater
effect on real earnings than a 1 percent increase in MSA employment. For example, for
blacks overall, a 1 percent increase in the wage premium increases real earnings by over 6
percent, whereas a 1 percent increase in MSA employment increases real earnings by only
0.5 percent. But it is risky to just compare the coefficients on different variables. It is
probably far more costly for policymakers to increase an MSA's industry wage premium by
1 percent than to increase an MSA's wage premium by 1 percent. Increasing an MSA's
industry wage premium by 1 percent requires extremely large shifts in MSA industry mix.
For example, a 1 percent increase in an MSA's industry wage premium could be
accomplished by shifting 10 percent of the MSA's employment to industries that pay 10
percent more, which seems hard to do. In contrast, a 1 percent increase in MSA

Figure 15: Effectiveness of 1 % Increase in MSA Wage Premium
in Reducing Black and White Poverty Rates
Reduction in Poverty Rate (in Rate Points)
2.0

1.685
(1.597)

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-.306
(.363)

-0.5

-1.0

1
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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated effects show reductionn poverty rate. For example, 1.685
effect for blacks means that a 1% increase in wage premium would reduce a black poverty rate mat was initially 20%
to 18.315%. Estimates use 1234 MSA-year observations for blacks, and 1432 MSA-year observations for whites.
All estimated models also include time dummies and MSA employment growth. Estimated models use a zero-lag
specification.
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employment may be achievable by feasible changes in state and local economic development
policies, according to the research literature reviewed in chapter 2 of Bartik (1991).21
Of course, it may not be possible to independently increase the MSA growth variable
and the MSA wage premium variable. These two variables could be causally related in
either direction. An increased MSA wage premium may increase the income of MSA
residents, resulting in increased consumer demand. This increased consumer demand may
lead to increased MSA employment in non-base industries such as retail industries. On the
other hand, MSA growth may tighten MSA labor markets, which may increase wages in the
average MSA industry compared to its national counterpart industry. These higher MSA
wages may discourage growth in the MSA by industries that are sensitive to wage costs.
These wage-sensitive industries tend to be industries in which pay is low relative to the
credentials required—low wage premium industries. The MSA's industry mix will shift
towards high wage premium industries.
Causality tests with this data base suggest that the causality runs both ways between
the MSA wage premium and MSA growth (table 16). These causality tests show particularly

21 There is another argument that it is more difficult to change the wage premium
variable by 1 percent than to change the employment growth variable by 1 percent. The
natural variation in the sample (the standard deviation in the sample) of the wage premium
variable is far less than the natural variation of the employment growth variable (table 8).
As a result, the beta coefficient—this report's coefficient times the ratio of the standard
deviation of the independent variable to the standard deviation of the dependent variable—of
the wage premium variable is usually about the same magnitude as the beta coefficient of the
employment growth variable in most of the estimated models. It is plausible that the costs of
changing some variable through policy are inversely related to the variable's standard
deviation in the sample. If so, the smaller standard deviation in the sample of the wage
premium variable than of the employment growth variable may indicate that it is more costly
to change the wage premium variable than change the employment growth variable.

Table 16
Tests of Causation Between MSA Growth
and Changes in the MSA Wage Premium

Direction of Causation Examined

Probability of F-test Statistic for Lagged
"Causative" Variables___________

Growth causing changes in Wage Premium

.0001

Changes in Wage Premium causing growth

.0419

Notes: These regressions regress (1) growth and (2) changes in the wage premium on five lagged values of
both variables. The relevant causality test is an F-test for whether the "other variable's" lagged values matter,
once we control for lagged values of the dependent variable.
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significant causal effects of MS A growth in increasing the MS A wage premium.
Thus, policy makers should realize that there may not be a clear tradeoff between
having more local growth and having higher "quality" local industries. Local growth and
higher quality local industries tend to go together. A successful growth strategy will make it
harder to pursue low-wage industries. Growth can be more easily sustained in the long run
by encouraging the growth of high-wage industries. A successful strategy of encouraging
high-wage industries will tend to encourage growth. A "growth" strategy and a "high-wage"
strategy should be viewed as complementary and not competing strategies.
The empirical results may also have implications for national policy towards highwage and low-wage-premium industries, although the case here is more unclear. The results
suggest, but do not prove, that national declines in high-wage-premium industries in the
1970s and 1980s may have hurt blacks more than whites. The results also suggest, but do
not prove, that a 1 percent national decline in average industry wage premium may, with
"spillover-multiplier" effects on other industries and labor supply, affect earnings by more
than 1 percent. The uncertainty arises because the estimates in this report, which show the
effects of MS A differentials in wage premium changes, cannot without further assumptions
be used to predict the effects of national changes in the average industry wage premium.
Among other factors, a national change in average wage premiums due to shifting industry
mix might have consequences for national wage and price inflation that cannot be captured in
the models presented here.22

22 This limitation is not a severe problem for the analysis in section V of the national
effects of evening out MS A growth, because that "thought experiment" held overall national
growth constant. As a first approximation, holding constant overall national employment
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VII.

Effects of MSA Decentralization on Black and White Economic Success

I now consider the effects of MSA decentralization on the real personal earnings of
various black and white groups. As described above, the MSA decentralization measure
used here is the percentage employment growth of the entire MSA minus the percentage
employment growth of the "central county" in the MSA.23 Positive values of this variable
imply decentralization. The hypothesis is that greater decentralization harms the job access
of at least some black groups, reducing their earnings. In addition to MSA decentralization,
all specifications in this section include as independent variables the time dummies, MSA
employment growth, and the MSA wage premium variable. 24
The specification used here might be questioned because it examines how
decentralization affects all MSA residents, whereas decentralization should most severely hurt
the economic fortunes of central city residents. But because blacks and less educated persons
have a greater probability of living in central cities, adverse effects on central city residents
growth should hold constant macroeconomic variables even if the distribution of MSA
demand or population changes.
23 That is, the decentralization variable is 100 times the following expression: the yearto-year change in the natural logarithm of the MSA's total employment minus the year-toyear change in the natural logarithm of employment in the county containing the central city
of the MSA. As mentioned in Table 3, this decentralization variable is equal to 100 times
the year-to-year change in the natural logarithm of the ratio of MSA employment to central
county employment.
24 In addition, the specifications included a dummy variable for whether the MSA was a
single-county MSA. From the definition of the decentralization variable, this variable will
always be zero for single-county MSAs. These zero values of this variable could be seen as
due to measurement error. Including a dummy for single-county MSAs tests for this
possibility. This dummy variable never had statistically significant effects, and its inclusion
did not appear to affect the coefficients on the other variables.
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should be detectable by examining effects on these groups. Furthermore, considering all
MSA residents avoids the tricky problem that the within-MSA choice of residence is clearly
endogenous. If decentralization hurts central city residents and helps suburban residents, it is
hard to tell whether this reflects real changes in economic outcomes or simply selective
migration from city to suburbs. But if decentralization hurts all blacks or all dropouts in the
MSA, one can not argue that this outcome results from particular high income blacks and
dropouts moving to the suburbs.
Table 17 reports estimated effects on real earnings in a model that includes as
independent variables the decentralization variable, metropolitan employment growth, the
wage premium variable, and the time dummies.25 The table 17 estimates are for a zero-lag
specification, that is a specification in which only current values of the independent variables
are included. There is no sign that decentralization has any significant negative effects on
the personal earnings of any group.
But for a few groups, a one-lag specification shows some signs that decentralization
may have a short-run effect. Table 18 reports short-run and long-run results from the onelag specification for various black and white subgroups. The estimates suggest significantly
negative short-run effects of decentralization on the personal earnings of blacks, black and
white high school dropouts, prime-age blacks and whites, and black males.26 This short-run
effect, however, appears to disappear quite quickly.

25 In addition, the specifications include a dummy variable for single-county MSAs, as
explained in the previous footnote.
.15.

26 Again, statistical significance statements are based on a 2-tail test probability level of

Table 17
Effects of MSA Growth, Changes in MSA Wage Premium,
and MSA Decentralization on Changes
in Real Earnings

Blacks
Whites
Black Dropouts
White Dropouts
Black Completers
White Completers
Black 16-24
White 16-24
Black 25-54
White 25-54
Black GE-55
White GE-55
Black Male
White Male
Black Female
White Female

Growth
.579"
(.256)
.449*"
(.101)

Wage Premium
5.981***
(2.808)
1.881**
(1.118)

.727

(.658)
(.222)
(.341)
(.107)

1.581
8.380***
7.076**

(.728)
(.247)
(.315)
(.124)
(.825)
(.276)

5.345
5.547***
6.117**

.4ir
.525*
.390**

1.095*
.574**
.593~
.494**
-.141
.398*
.450
.509**
.600*
.280**

(.333)
(.119)
(.372)
(.159)

.476

1.519
11.714
3.445
5.757*
1.407
7.100**
2.327

Decentralization
-.041
-.103

(.359)
(.173)

(7.060)
(2.528)
(3.721)
(1.177)

.181
-.038
-.288
-.165

(.910)
(.385)
(.480)
(.182)

(8.141)
(2.804)
(3.460)
(1.370)
(8.701)
(3.035)

-.428
.067
-.009
-.173
-.723
-.156

(1.004)
(.420)
(.452)
(.215)
(1.077)
(.462)

(3.648)
(1.308)
(4.049)
(1.787)

-.119
-.084
.050
-.106

(.472)
(.205)
(.518)
(.269)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 15%, 10%, and
5 % levels for a two-tail test. The decentralization variable is the percentage difference between overall MSA
employment growth minus central city county employment growth. All specifications control time dummies and
a single-county MSA dummy. The estimation period runs from 1975-76 to 1988-89. The sample size for all
groups is 17 observations less than the sample size for each group on the list in the notes to Table 12. These 17
fewer observations occur because 2 MSAs in the BEA data base have missing central county employment data.
All estimates reported in this table are for zero-lag specifications. Zero-lag is the optimal lag length according
to the SBC, for all lag lengths from zero to four years, for all groups except white males and whites 25-54.
For these two groups, one lag is the optimal lag length according to the SBC. Long-run growth effects and
wage premium effects for these two groups, in a one-lag specification are: WM, growth, .265** (.149); wage
premium, 3.703*** (1.665); W25, growth, .258* (.158); wage premium, 2.974** (1.771). One-lag results for
decentralization variable are listed in Table 18.

Table 18
Short-Run and Long-Run Effects on Real Earnings
of Decentralization in 1-Lag Specification

Short-Run Effect

Long-Run Effect

Blacks
Whites

-1.549"
-.611"*

(.833)
(.357)

-.159
-.099

(.412)
(.250)

Black Dropouts
White Dropouts
Black Completers
White Completers

-3.736**
-1.430**
-.822
-.793***

(2.015)
(0.817)
(1.097)
(.359)

-.048
.105
-.519
-.161

(1.073)
(.450)
(.546)
(.205)

Black 16-24
White 16-24
Black 25-54
White 25-54
Black GE-55
White GE-55

-1.162
.824
-1.542*
-1.037***
-3.040
-.309

(2.392)
(.904)
(1.039)
(.427)
(2.466)
(.916)

-.073
.159
-.240
-.120
-.790
-.350

(1.169)
(.483)
(.518)
(.245)
(1.212)
(.531)

Black Male
White Male
Black Female
White Female

-1.940**
-.575
-1.394
-.597

(1.093)
(.402)
(1.156)
(.569)

-.237
-.118
.052
.003

(.550)
(.232)
(.595)
(.311)

Notes: Short-run effect is immediate effect on real earnings of a change in decentralization variable, and longrun effect is cumulative effect after 1 year of decentralization, in a specification with 1 lag in all economic
development variables (growth, wage premium change, and decentralization). Specifications also control time
dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 15%, 10%, and
5% levels for a 2-tail test. Number of MSA time period observations on which estimates are based are as
follows: all white groups, 1186; B, 988; BD, 789; BC, 935; B16, 777; B25, 947; B55, 757; BM, 924; BF,
946.
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A natural interpretation of this result is that the MS A labor market can adjust
relatively quickly, but not instantaneously, to within-MSA shifts in employment. One would
expect adjustments of labor supply within an MSA to be easier than adjustments of labor
supply across MSAs. But these within-MSA adjustments might still take some time,
particularly for less mobile groups such as blacks and high school dropouts, who are
concentrated in central cities.
A second interpretation is that the lack of long-term effects of decentralization is due
to the crude nature of the decentralization measure used here. Measures used in other
studies that are specific to the person's neighborhood, such as average journey-to-work times
in that neighborhood for jobs for which the person is qualified, are far better measures of
how job access affects the person.

VIII. Conclusion

This report's findings support a key theme of the demand-side view of black urban
poverty problems: local labor demand conditions significantly affect black economic success.
This demand-side view has been most prominently advocated by William Julius Wilson and
John Kasarda, although others such as Bluestone and Harrison (1982) have also suggested the
importance of demand-side conditions in explaining black economic problems. Although
cultural and psychological factors may affect black economic problems, as Lawrence Mead
and others contend, culture and psychology do not prevent poverty from being reduced when
the local economy improves.
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But this report's findings suggest that the features of local demand that matter are
somewhat different than the features Wilson and Kasarda emphasize. Wilson and Kasarda
stress that black poverty problems are being worsened by manufacturing decline in central
cities. This report's findings suggest that the overall metropolitan economy is at least as
important as the movement of jobs from central cities to suburbs. The findings also suggest
why manufacturing decline may cause problems: manufacturing industries tend to be high
"wage premium" industries, paying well relative to the credentials required. Employment
declines in high wage premium industries, whether in manufacturing or services, seem to
play an important role in harming black earnings. Although some deindustrialization
researchers, such as Bluestone and Harrison (1982), have stressed the importance of an
industry's wage levels, Bluestone and Harrison's point has sometimes become lost in
subsequent discussion.
The report's findings suggest general directions for public policy but do not prove
the case for any specific policy program. Economic development policies that increase
metropolitan growth and attract high wage premium industries can provide important labor
market benefits for both white and black residents. But exactly which economic development
policies (tax abatements, technology development programs, general tax cuts, improvements
in local education, assistance to manufacturers for modernization and exporting, business
incubators, entrepreneurial training programs) work best to accomplish these goals is unclear.
National policies that seek to provide blacks with more high wage jobs can make a
substantial difference in reducing black poverty and increasing black economic success. But
which such black labor demand policies (local economic development policies, helping blacks
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migrate to healthier metropolitan economies, enterprise zones, public service jobs, wage
subsidies for private employment for disadvantaged workers) will be most effective in
helping blacks per dollar spent is unclear. The general policy direction of trying to increase
demand for black labor in local economies is sound. But much more policy experimentation
and research needs to be done to determine how best to improve the local economic climate
facing blacks.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

This technical appendix fills in details about the methodology and data of the report
Economic Development and Black Economic Success. The appendix is divided into three
main sections with several sub-sections. Section 1 discusses the estimation methodology.
Section 2 discusses the regression-adjusted estimated economic outcome variables (dependent
variables). Section 3 provides more detail on the economic development variables that are
constructed using two-digit industry data.

1.

Details on the Estimation Methodology

Dependent Variable Definitions
Most dependent variables analyzed in this report are the percentage change in MSA
average economic outcomes for different groups from year t - 1 to year t. But calculating
percentage change is problematic if an economic outcome variable is nonpositive in either
year t or year t -1. For example, if percentage change is calculated as 100 times the change
in the natural logarithm, the natural logarithm is undefined at non-positive values of the
economic outcome variables. If percentage change is calculated using year t -1 values as a
base, the percentage change number will be infinite if the economic outcome variable has a
zero value in year t -1, and will have an unexpected sign if the economic outcome variable
has a negative value in year t -1. Even if economic outcome variables for year t or year
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t - 1 are positive, percentage change numbers can be large if the positive numbers for year t
- 1 or year t are small. These large percentage change numbers could unduly influence
regression estimates.
For many MSA-year cases, this project's economic outcome variables are zero,
negative, or a small positive number. These problematic cases arise because particular
demographic groups often have a small sample size in a particular MSA and year. For
example, it might be that all black high school dropouts interviewed in Kalamazoo in 1988
happened to have zero earnings. Negative numbers can arise for earnings or wages because
this study includes self-employment earnings, which can be negative. In addition, the
regression adjustment procedure can produce negative predictions for economic outcomes in
an MSA for some group. Negative predictions would occur if a group has surprisingly low
values of the economic outcomes relative to the group's educational and experience
credentials. It is theoretically feasible to constrain the regression adjustment procedure to
prevent negative outcomes (for example, some type of tobit procedure). But such elaborate
statistical constraints would be prohibitively expensive in time given all the groups and
economic outcomes considered in this project.
To avoid these problems, percentage change in each economic outcome variable was
simply defined as the absolute change in that variable in that MSA from year t - 1 to year t,
divided by the sample mean over all MSAs and years in that variable, times 100, or

where ymgt is the mean value of some economic outcome for group g in MSA m in year r,
and yg is the mean value of that same economic outcome over all MSAs and years. This
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definition is equivalent to estimating a model with absolute change in the economic outcome

variable as a dependent variable, and then multiplying all estimated coefficients by 100 over
the mean of the economic outcome variable to get percentage effects.
One objection to this procedure is that these percentage change values will go up or
down over time depending on the generally prevailing level of the economic outcome
variable in the nation. Perhaps this could bias estimates if the economic development
variables show some time trend. But all the estimating equations include a complete set of
dummy variables for time periods. These time period dummies should absorb any systematic
changes in percentage change values over time. In addition, the dependent variables are all
defined in real terms. There is often no clear time trend in the real level of the economic
outcome variables.

Heteroskedasticity
The report's main task is to estimate equations with the year-to-year percentage
change in MSA average economic outcome variables as dependent variables and the
percentage change in MSA "economic development" variables as independent variables. One
problem in estimating these equations is that their dependent variables are probably
heteroskedastic. The regression-adjusted MSA average economic outcome variables are
derived from the Current Population Survey. The CPS sample size varies a great deal from
one MSA to another. Because the sample size is small for some MSAs and large for others,
the error in measuring these regression-adjusted group means will be quite large in small
sample size MSAs and much smaller in large MSAs. This variation in measurement error
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should create considerable heteroskedasticity in the year-to-year changes in the economic
outcome variable. Without some correction, this heteroskedasticity will make the coefficient
estimates less efficient, and will bias the estimated standard errors.
Any correction for this heteroskedasticity problem must consider the time and
complexity costs of imposing this correction on the many models estimated in this project. A
correction that is reasonably simple to simultaneously impose on many models has great
appeal.
A reasonably simple heteroskedasticity correction can be developed if we make some
simplifying assumptions that are literally false but likely to be approximately true. Suppose
that the dependent variable, instead of being the percentage change in the regression-adjusted
mean for MSA m from time t - 1 to time t, was instead the percentage change in the
ordinary mean. Assume further that the overall mean for the group (yg above) is accurately
enough estimated to be treated as non-stochastic. Assume further that the only source of
error in the estimating equation is the measurement error in measuring the group means for
the MSA for years t - 1 and t. Finally, assume that this measurement error is uncorrelated
between years t - 1 and t.
Under all these assumptions, the variance in the disturbance term in a typical
estimating equation can be written as the following equation:

(T-2)

n<w) •

where emgl is the disturbance term from the estimating equation in section III of the report's
main text, a2 is the variance of observations on the outcome variable for an individual
person, and Ngmt is the sample size for group g in MSA m in year /. Heteroskedasticity can
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then be corrected by weighting all variables involved with a given group's outcome by 1 over
the square root of the term in brackets in equation (T.2). This term in brackets varies from
observation to observation only due to the sample size in years t - 1 and t for that group and
MSA. This same weighting will be used for a particular group, MSA, and year, regardless
of the dependent variables and independent variables in a particular specification. Because
reweighting is not required if the specification changes, more specifications can be tested in
less time.
This heteroskedasticity correction is literally false in several ways. But this correction
is still likely to provide a good approximate correction. The measurement error for
regression-adjustment means will not follow exactly the formula given in equation (T.2). But
this measurement error should strongly depend on the cell size in that MSA for those two
years, as (T.2) suggests. There is some correlation over time in the CPS measurement error,
as some households are included in the sample in two consecutive years. But this correlation
is likely to be roughly proportional to the term in brackets, so the same measurement error
variance will likely apply.1 Finally, because of other sources of error in the estimating
equation, the disturbance term variance actually should equal a constant term plus some slope
coefficient times the bracket term in equation (T.2). But this bracket/measurement error

1 For example, when the sample size for the MSA and group is the same in both years,
and exactly half of the CPS sample is retained from year to year (the extreme case), then the
covariance between the measurement error will be given by
(l/2)po2 [l/Ay
where p is the year to year correlation in the economic outcome variable for the typical
person in the sample both years.
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variance is likely to be quite large compared to other sources of error. Also, as Kennedy
(1992, p. 131) has pointed out, attempts to estimate the disturbance term variance as a linear
function of the bracket term are likely to yield extremely imprecise estimates of the intercept
and slope coefficient. Estimation procedures will often be more efficient if they ignore the
other sources of disturbance variance.
Thus, there are some good arguments that this simple heteroskedasticity correction
will not be a bad approximation. Just as important, any of these possible "improvements" in
estimating the heteroskedasticity would tremendously complicate the estimation procedure for
all these many models, groups and variables. These more complicated procedures would not
necessarily improve the efficiency of the estimates.
Table Tl reports White heteroskedasticity tests and standard error corrections for the
black and white personal earnings models (White, 1980). These tests and corrections use
variables that have already been weighted and transformed, using the simple approximation
procedure implied by equation (T.I). This weighting is intended to eliminate
heteroskedasticity. In addition, after weighting, all variables were transformed to correct for
serial correlation. 2 Thus, these tests are examining whether there is any sign of significant
heteroskedasticity, which might affect the accuracy of our estimated standard errors, after

2 This estimated serial correlation is always negative. This negative serial correlation
probably reflects measurement error again. Because ymgt.i enters negatively in %Aymgt, but
positively in %Aymgt.ly the measurement error in y^^ will cause %Aymgt and %^ymgt-1 to be
negatively correlated.

Table Tl
White's Test for Remaining Heteroskedasticity
After Simple Heteroskedasticity Correction

Standard errors for
Estimated LR Effect of Growth
White's ChiSquared Statistic

df

Probability

White-corrected
Consistent
Standard error

Original Uncorrected
standard errors

Adjusted Real
Personal
Earnings
Equation for
Blacks

83.65

79

.3388

.187

.185

Adjusted Real
Personal
Earnings
Equation for
Whites

80.56

74

.2815

.083

.074

Notes: Estimating equations are for zero-lag specification, with simple correction for heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation.
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doing our simple heteroskedasticity-serial correlation corrections. 3 The White test clearly
shows no sign of any remaining heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors do not differ much from the original standard errors.

Weighting Procedure for Comparing Estimates for One Group With the Estimates for Other
Groups
A similar weighting procedure is used for regressions comparing results for one group
with results for some other group (e.g., black high school dropouts versus white high school
dropouts, and white high school dropouts versus white high school completers). These
comparison regressions examine whether an economic development variable such as MSA
employment growth has the same percentage effect on real earnings for two different
demographic groups. The comparison regressions use as a dependent variable the percentage
change in some economic outcome variable for one group (call it group r) minus the change
in some economic outcome for another group (group c). Suppose we continue to use the
same assumptions that were used to derive equation (T.2). In addition, assume that the
measurement errors for the two groups are uncorrelated. Under these assumptions, the error
variance for these "comparison regressions" will be given by the following equation:

3 The White test detects types of heteroskedasticity that are correlated with various
products and cross-products of the independent variables in the model. It is these types of
heteroskedasticity that affect the consistency of the package-produced standard errors
(Kennedy, 1992, pp. 130, 131). Other types of heteroskedasticity may exist, and could
allow for more efficient estimators, but these other types of heteroskedasticity will not cause
the standard errors to be incorrect.
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Assume that the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean for each group is
approximately the same. It is plausible that this assumption is approximately true compared
to the tremendous variance in group sample size across MS As. Then the error variance for
these comparison regressions can be rewritten as the following equation:
.j) + (HNCM)
where* £ is some constant. To correct for heteroskedasticity, one over the square root of the
term in brackets is used to weight all variables for comparison regressions. The weighted
variables are then used in estimation with a first-order serial correlation correction.

Possible Biases in Standard Error Estimates Due to Pooling Cross-Section and Time-Series
Data
The regression models of how economic development variables affect MSA economic
outcomes pool data across MS As and years. Such pooling of cross-section and time-series
data can bias the usual estimates of standard errors. The usual standard error calculations
assume that the disturbance is uncorrelated across different observations. But some
correlation across observations is often likely if cross-section and time-series data are pooled.
For the regression models of this report, the disturbance terms for the same year may be
correlated across different MSAs, and the disturbance terms for the same MSA may be
correlated across different years. If there is correlation across different observations in
disturbance terms, a new observation may not add as much new information as is assumed by
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the simplest regression techniques. Hence, the true standard errors of the coefficient
estimates may be higher than the estimated standard errors that are provided using simple
regression techniques. These problems with pooling data have been extensively discussed in
the econometrics and labor economics literature by Moulton (1986, 1988, 1990), Moulton
and Randolph (1989), Freeman (1989, 1991), and Dickens and Katz (1987).
Any correlation in the disturbance across MSAs for a given year should be absorbed
by the year dummies included in all the regression equations. Any correlation in the
disturbance across years for a given MSA will be reduced because this project is analyzing
changes in economic outcomes in the MSA rather than the level of economic outcomes in the
MSA. Levels of economic outcomes in an MSA may be highly positively correlated because
unobserved attributes of the MSA—such as its amenities, city size, etc.—may heavily
influence wages and other economic outcomes in the city. But any unobserved attributes of
the MSA that are fixed over time disappear in a changes specification. In addition, the
regression estimation always corrects for the serial correlation that occurs between two
observations for adjacent years in the same MSA. This serial correlation correction could
potentially correct for any unobserved shocks that change economic outcomes in an MSA and
persist from year to year. As it turns out, however, the estimated serial correlation is always
negative. This negative serial correlation is probably due to measurement error in these
CPS-derived MSA regression-adjusted means. This measurement error-induced negative
serial correlation apparently overwhelms any positive serial correlation that might be caused
by persistent shocks to MSA economic outcomes.
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Despite this evidence, one could argue that there might be some significant positive
correlation in the disturbance term across non-adjacent years for the same MSA. This
positive correlation would bias usual standard error estimates. This positive correlation of
the disturbance within MSAs can be analyzed as being caused by unobserved "random
effects"—shocks to the disturbance term—that are MSA-specific and are part of the overall
disturbance term (Moulton, 1986, 1989, 1990). Moulton and Randolph suggest that the
presence of such random effects can be tested for using an F-test of whether a vector of
MSA "fixed effects"—dummy variables for each MSA—is statistically significant.4
I applied Moulton's F-test to two regressions: the regressions with percentage change
in overall black and white real earnings as dependent variables, and time dummies and
metropolitan employment growth as independent variables, with no lags in growth.5 These
F-tests clearly reject the hypothesis of unobserved MSA fixed or random effect components.
The relevant F-test statistic for blacks is .6047 (df=208, 1007; probability =.0000057). The
F-test for whites is .7347 (df=233, 1180; probability=.0017916). These F-tests show that
unobserved MSA effects do not significantly affect real earnings growth once we control
current MSA employment growth. Hence, there is no evidence that the standard error

4 Moulton and Randolph show that the traditional "Lagrange Multiplier" test for the
presence of random effects is likely to be biased in most reasonably sized samples, and will
too often reject the hypothesis of random effects.
5 This zero-lag model with only current growth and time dummies provides the maximum
scope for any unobserved MSA effects to be present. Unobserved MSA effects are even less
likely to be present if we add additional lags in growth, or add other MSA economic
development variables to the specification.
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estimates presented in this report are biased by unobserved correlations across observations
in different years for the same MSA. 6

2.

Details on the Regression-Adjusted Economic Outcome Variables

Adjusting for Estimated Local Prices and Inflation
All estimated dollar amounts for average MSA economic outcomes are converted to
real terms using estimates of local prices and local inflation rates. This subsection describes
the procedures used for estimating local prices and local inflation rates.
For most of the economic outcome variables, it is only crucial to have good estimates
of local inflation rates, not local price levels. The dependent variables used in this report's
main estimating equations are the percentage change in MSA economic outcomes from year
to year. For variables such as personal earnings, or average earnings per week or per hour,
the real percentage change from year to year in the variable approximately equals the
nominal percentage change minus the local inflation rate.
But changes in the MSA poverty rate can not be expressed as simple function of the
inflation rate. Estimated local price levels will also make a difference in estimating poverty
rate changes.

6 In addition, the estimated effects of MSA growth in this zero-lag, MSA fixed effects
specification are actually larger than are estimated without MSA fixed effects. The effects of
a 1% shock to MSA employment on blacks in this fixed effects specification is 1.232
(standard error=.247); the effects on whites is .831 (.101). Hence, controlling for MSA
fixed effects seems to tend to increase the estimated effects of employment growth on real
earnings. However, it should be noted that controlling for MSA fixed effects may also tend
to make the estimates more likely to represent short-run effects rather than long-run effects.
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Unfortunately, the data on MS A inflation and prices are sparse. MS A inflation data
are consistently available only for the 1970s and 1980s for 24 MSAs.7'8 MSA price level
data are only available for a few years in the 1970s, for around 38 MSAs. These MSA
"price level" data are three sets of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' "living standard
budgets", showing how much it would cost in different MSAs to achieve an intermediate,
higher, and lower "standard of living."9
To estimate prices and inflation for MSAs and years for which data are not available,
I use the available MSA price and inflation data to make predictions. First, I estimate the
determinants of MSA price level differentials for 38 MSAs in 1976. The dependent variable
in this estimation is the BLS lower living standard budget for these 38 MSAs. The lower
living standard budget is chosen because the price level information is only needed for
7 Data are also available for part of this period for an additional MSA, Miami.
8 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports these MSA numbers in the form of
consumer price indices for different MSAs for different time periods, which might imply that
these indices allow a comparison of price levels across MSAs. However, all these indices
are arbitrarily set equal to 100 as of the same base year for all MSAs, so a comparison of
indices across MSAs would really only show how much relative prices in different MSAs
have changed since the base year. Also, the market basket used in different MSAs is
different, and there is no attempt to ensure that the market baskets priced in different MSAs
would yield the same level of utility or well-being.
9 These MSA "living standard" budgets also price different market baskets in different
MSAs. However, these market baskets are supposed to be what it costs to achieve the same
standard of living, given variations in such factors as climate (more clothes are needed to
reach the same living standard in cold MSAs) and customs (certain foods are consumed more
in some MSAs than others). These different market baskets could be seen as an ad hoc
attempt to calculate the minimum cost needed to achieve a given utility level, and this
attempt, if successful, would constitute a true cost of living index. Many economists might
prefer a less ambitious but less ad hoc procedure of just pricing the identical market basket in
different MSAs. But analysis of the intermediate living standard budget does not reveal any
major changes in relative living costs when a fixed market basket is substituted for the MSAdifferentiated market baskets. (Sherwood, 1975).
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calculating poverty rates. The lower living standard budget will probably better approximate
the prices facing persons near the poverty line than will the intermediate or higher living
standard budgets. The estimates of the determinants of MSA "lower living standard" prices
are then used to predict relative price levels as of 1976 for all other MSAs. Second, I
estimate the determinants of MSA inflation differentials during the 1970s and 1980s for 24
MSAs. This estimated relationship is used to predict inflation rates for the other MSAs for
each year during the 1970s and 1980s. In both the price and inflation estimation, the goal of
the estimation is not to produce a full structural model of MSA prices or inflation. Instead,
the goal is an equation that will yield good out-of-sample predictions. Finally, I combine
these price level estimates for 1976 and inflation estimates for all years to generate a
predicted MSA price level for each year and each MSA.
Once these predictions are done, real poverty rates and real economic outcomes can
be calculated for each year and each MSA. This study's main dependent variables—the yearto-year percentage change in MSA real economic outcomes and the change in the MSA
poverty rate—can then be calculated. All these calculations use actual data for local prices
and inflation when such data are available, and predicted values for prices and inflation when
the actual values are unavailable.
Table T2 reports the estimated determinants of 1976 MSA price level differentials.
The regional dummies simply reflect the well-known price level differences in different
regions of the country. The education variable is the average educational requirements in the
MSA implied by its 1976 industry mix, which might affect local wages and prices. This
particular specification was chosen over specifications that also included the MSA's size

Table T2

Estimates of the Determinants of the Percentage Difference
of MS A Prices from the U.S. Average

Coefficient

f-statistic

Intercept

-2.028

-3.92

Educational Requirements
Due to Industrial Mix

0.155

3.89

North Central Region

-0.0074

-0.87

Northeast Region

0.0257

2.68

South Region

-0.0526

-5.37

West Region

0.0343

3.11

Notes: Dependent variable is [ln(MSA costs for lower living standard budget in 1976) - ln(U.S. average costs
in 1976 for lower living standard budget)]. Instead of dropping a dummy, sum of region coefficients was
restricted to zero; as shown by Suits (1984) and Kennedy (1986), this implies that coefficients show differential
of MSAs in region from U.S. average. Number of observations is 38; adjusted R-squared is .515. Mean
standard error of individual prediction over 313 MSAs was .036; max was .048.
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(measured by employment) and the MSA's average wage premium. The chosen specification
was better than these alternatives according to the Akaike Information Criterion. The Akaike
Information Criterion is a standard model selection criterion that attempts to minimize the
out-of-sample prediction error, which is accomplished by excluding variables whose
estimated coefficients are too uncertain. 10 The resulting specification has a reasonably
adequate R-squared for a cross-section equation. The average estimated standard error of the
predictions is 3.6%. This standard error implies a 95% probability for the typical MS A that
the prediction is within 7.2% of the true relative price level.
For inflation, two prediction equations were constructed for two different time
periods, due to differences over time in available data. For the time period from 1971-72
through 1976-77, inflation determinants were estimated using the equation reported in Table
T3. Time period dummies reflect how MS A inflation is affected by national factors, and the
regional inflation variable reflects how MSA inflation is affected by regional factors. MSA
employment growth may affect MSA inflation by increasing local land and housing prices
and wages. Using the AIC, I chose this specification over a specification that also included
the change in the MSA manufacturing share. This equation has a quite high R-squared and
many highly significant right-hand side variables. More important, the equation yields a
quite small average standard error of individual predictions of .6%. This standard error
implies that for the average MSA-year observation, the inflation prediction has a 95% chance
of being within 1.2% of the true MSA inflation rate for that year.

10 As pointed out in Amemiya (1985), the AIC is virtually identical to his Prediction
Criterion, which explicitly is designed to minimize out-of-sample prediction error.

Table T3
Estimates of Determinants of MSA Inflation
1971-72 to 1976-77

Coefficient

f-statistic

Intercept

0.03807

5.34

1972 Dummy

-0.02180

-5.30

1973 Dummy

-0.00494

-2.58

1974 Dummy

0.01793

3.57

1975 Dummy

0.00968

2.41

1976 Dummy

-0.00771

-2.59

1977 Dummy

Excluded

Excluded

Region's Inflation

0.427

3.93

MSA Employment Growth

0.05140

1.33

Lagged MSA Growth

-0.00132

-0.03

Twice Lagged Growth

0.05847

1.61

Notes: Inflation measured as [ln(MSA price index in year f) - ln(MSA price index in year t-1)]. Region's
inflation is rate for the region MSA is in (4 regions report inflation rates, Northeast, North Central, South, and
West). MSA Employment Growth is ln(MSA employment in year f) - ln(MSA Employment in year t-1). Lags
are this variable one and two years ago. Number of observations is 144, Adjusted R-squared is .936. Mean
standard error of individual predictions is .0064; max is .0093.
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For the time period from 1977-78 through 1988-89, I estimated MSA inflation
determinants using the equation reported in table T4. This equation includes the same
independent variables as in the inflation prediction equation reported in table T3. The
additional independent variables in table T4 include current and lagged changes in
educational requirements. According to the AIC, this specification was superior to alternative
specifications that included changes in the MSA wage premium, changes in the MSA's
manufacturing share, and changes in other MSA "demographic share" economic development
variables. Why increases in the MSA educational requirements variable are associated with
lower MSA inflation is unclear. Perhaps increases in educational requirements over time
may contribute to reduced wages in some local retail industries that as a result have an
excess supply of workers. Alternatively, perhaps higher education industries are attracted to
MS As with lower inflation rates. Whatever the reason, the resulting specification again has a
quite high R-squared, and a low average standard error of prediction.
After these estimates were used to construct initial price level estimates for all MSAs
for all years, as described above, two additional adjustments were made. First, all the MSA
indices were multiplied by a constant to ensure that the employment-weighted average MSA
price index for 1989 is 100; that is, all indices were adjusted so that all nominal dollar
amounts will be measured in 1989 "average MSA" dollars. Second, MSA prices in 1982 and
previous years were multiplied by a year-specific but MSA-invariant factor, equal to the ratio
of the CPI-U-X1 price index for that year in the nation to the ordinary CPI-U index for the
nation for that year. The CPI-U official price index prior to 1983 is often argued to have
overestimated overall inflation because of problems in its calculation and treatment of

Table T4
Estimates of Determinants of MSA Inflation
1977-78 to 1988-89

Coefficient

f-statistic

Intercept

0.00581

1.01

1978 Dummy

0.01268

2.81

1979 Dummy

0.01836

2.61

1980 Dummy

0.02238

2.45

1981 Dummy

0.01899

2.96

1982 Dummy

0.01010

2.80

1983 Dummy

0.01401

3.77

1984 Dummy

0.00853

2.27

1985 Dummy

0.00108

0.28

1986 Dummy

-0.00742

-1.64

1987 Dummy

0.00076

0.23

1988 Dummy

0.00306

0.97

1989 Dummy
Region's Inflation

Excluded
0.765

Excluded
7.27

MSA Employment Growth

-0.11465

-1.98

Lagged MSA Growth

0.13333

1.92

Twice Lagged Growth

0.07012

1.29

Change in MSA Educational
Requirements

-0.17628

-1.54

Lagged Change in Educational
Requirements

-0.06664

-0.59

Twice Lagged Change in
Educational Requirements

-0.14026

-1.30

Notes; Change in educational requirements is the economic development variable described in Table 3 of text.
Number of observations is 299. Adjusted R-squared is .913. Mean standard error of individual predictions is
.0114; max is .0169.
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housing prices. The CPI-U-X1 is an unofficial index prepared by BLS that attempts to
correct for these problems in the treatment of inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. A more
sophisticated version of the CPI-U-X1 became the official CPI-U price index in 1983.
Hence, this correction attempts to at least roughly avoid over-estimating the inflation rate,
and thus underestimating improvements in poverty, during the 1970s and early 1980s.

Choice of Control Variables for Regression Adjustment Procedure
The purpose of the regression adjustment procedure is to accurately predict—for each
demographic group, MSA, and year—the value of each economic outcome for a person with
"standard" characteristics. As described in the text, these "standard" characteristics are
average characteristics for blacks as of the March 1987 CPS. These predictions are
"regression-adjusted" means. Regression-adjusted mean values of economic outcomes are
preferable to ordinary MSA mean values of economic outcomes because they are more
comparable across MSAs and over time. Adjusted means compare persons with the same
characteristics, whereas ordinary means may be unusually high or low because of an unusual
mix of persons in the MSA in that year.
A good prediction must use a regression specification that is complete and includes
only right-hand side variables whose effets are statistically significant at some minimum level
of significance. The regression specification must capture the relevant characteristics of
persons that explain economic outcomes. Yet if the specification includes too many variables
that are statistically insignificant, the resulting predictions will have high standard errors.

T-21
I initially considered estimating a separate regression equation for each year, MS A,
economic outcome, and demographic group. But preliminary experiments showed that this
approach resulted in adjusted means with unacceptably high standard errors. Many MSAs
have small samples in the Current Population Survey. Allowing regression coefficients to
vary by MSA resulted in imprecise estimates of the regression coefficients and therefore
imprecise predictions of the economic outcomes for persons with "standard" characteristics.
Instead, I estimated a specification, for each year, economic outcome, and
demographic group, that used an economic outcome as a dependent variable, and the
following types of independent variables: MSA dummies, and selected personal
characteristic variables. This specification allows the average level of the economic outcome
to vary by MSA. But the effects of the personal characteristic variables are constrained to be
the same in all MSAs. Although this constraint is unlikely to be literally true, imposing it
reduces the standard error of the predictions. Separate regressions were run for each year,
and demographic group, so coefficients were allowed to vary from year to year and over
different demographic groups.
The personal characteristics used as independent variables were a dummy variable for
gender, a dummy variable for high school completion, years of education completed, years
of education squared and cubed, age, and powers of age up to the fifth power. This
specification was selected after some experimentation. This experimentation concentrated on
picking a model that would be a good specification for black personal earnings. All these
variables are statistically significant for blacks overall. Furthermore, plots of the residuals
by age or education level do not reveal any important age or education groups for which this
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specification tends to overpredict or underpredict earnings for blacks. The number of powers
used in age may seem high to some readers, but recent research suggests that labor
economists have often used too few powers in age or experience to accurately capture ageearnings profiles (Murphy and Welch, 1990).
Table T5 summarizes the results from a typical regression used to calculate the
adjusted means. This particular regression is for blacks overall, for the year 1986. As can
be seen in the table, all the variables are statistically significant.
One possible criticism of this regression adjustment procedure is that it restricts the
effect of age, education, or gender on earnings to be the same in all MSAs. This criticism is
valid for the calculation of regression adjusted means for blacks overall or whites overall.
But this restriction is later relaxed because the report also analyzes changes in regressionadjusted means for different subgroups of blacks and whites. Separate regression adjustment
procedures were done for each subgroup: two education groups (high school dropouts and
high school completers), three age groups (persons 16-24; 25-54; 55 and over), and both
genders. For each of these demographic subgroups for which this regression adjustment
procedure was done, a separate regression was run. Thus, all of these regressions'
coefficients, including the MSA dummies' coefficients, were allowed to vary between
demographic subgroups. Because the MSA dummies coefficients vary between subgroups,
different MSAs are allowed under this procedure to have different relative earnings for high
school dropouts versus completers, or for the three age groups considered, or for females
versus males.

Table T5
Effects of Personal Characteristics on Earnings
for Blacks, 1986, with MSA Dummies Included

Coefficient

/-statistic

37837.4506

3.44

865.6525

2,21

(EDUCATION)2

-147.9815

-3.15

(EDUCATION)3

8.7511

5.54

AGE
AGE2

-7634.7681

-8.64

400.9253

9.92

AGE3

-8.7771

-10.22

AGE4

0.0846

9.87

AGE5

-0.00030

-9.21

Intercept
EDUCATION

GENDER DUMMY VARIABLE
(FEMALE=1)

-3774.2857

-17.66

HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETION
DUMMY VARIABLE
(COMPLETIONS)

1344.2052

3.33

Notes; Personal earnings is dependent variable. In addition to variables listed in this table, the regression also
included as independent variables a complete set of MSA dummy variables. F-test for significance of MSA
dummies: 2.03 (df=209; 6969); probability of F-test of this size when no true effect of MSA dummies is
.0001. Adjusted R-squared = .383; Sample size = 7,189.
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Calculation of Standard Errors for Late 1970s to Late 1980s Percentage Change in Real
Earnings for Selected MSAs (Figure 3)
Figure 3 presented estimates of the percentage change in regression adjusted real
personal earnings for blacks and whites separately, in selected MSAs, from the late 1970s to
the late 1980s. This figure reported standard errors of these estimates. This subsection of
the technical appendix will outline how these standard errors were calculated. This
calculation is quite straightforward. There is but one complication: because some CPS
households remain in the CPS sample from one year to the next, the errors in estimating
MS A means for adjacent years are positively correlated.
The variance of these percentage change numbers is given by the following formula:
(T5)

F[100(F8 -r7)/F7] «

Y7 is the average regression-adjusted real personal earnings for a particular MS A, either for
blacks or whites, for 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979. This is a simple average, calculated as
the sum of the individual years' figures divided by four. Y8 is a similar average for 1986
through 1989. This variance calculation is an approximation relying on a Taylor-series
expansion.
The variance of the late 1970s average, 77, is given by the following formula:
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(T.6)

+ \ [C(Y16,
o

Y76 is the regression-adjusted mean personal earnings for blacks or whites in a particular
MS A in 1976, Y77 for 1977, etc. The formula assumes that the CPS sample is independent
in non-adjacent years, but may have some correlation in adjacent years. The CPS sampling
structure is such that half the housing units in the sample are replaced from one March to the
next, whereas the other half of the housing units interviewed are the same from one March to
the next. As a result, calculated statistics for adjacent years should have some correlation,
whereas statistics in non-adjacent years should not be correlated. A formula similar to
equation (T.6) applies to the variance of Y8.
I assume the following correlation among regression-adjusted means for adjacent
years:

The assumption of a year-to-year correlation of .30 relies on information from the Census
Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau, 1991, Table D-6 on p. 401). Strictly speaking, this correlation
of .30 only applies to unadjusted simple means for personal income figures. One would
think that the regression adjustment procedure should reduce the year-to-year correlation,
because the regression adjustment eliminates some of the sampling error that results from
happening to draw a sample with unusual personal characteristics. As a result, using
equation (T.7) may result in overstating the year to year correlation, and hence overstating
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all the variances in equations (T.5) and (T.6). Thus, the reported standard errors in figure 3
may be a bit too high.
To calculate all these variances, I used SAS to calculate the variance of the
regression-adjusted means for each MSA, year, and group (blacks or whites) in the late
1970s and late 1980s. This variance depends on the variance-covariance matrix of the
coefficient estimates and the vector of standard characteristics used to calculate the
regression-adjusted means. These variances were then plugged into equations (T.7) and
(T.6), and then substituted into equation (T.5). The square root of these variance estimates
in equation (T.5) are reported as standard errors in Figure 3.

3.

Details on the Construction and Use of the Economic Development Variables

Overcoming Suppressed 2-Digit Industries
Several of the MSA "economic development" variables depend on the MSA's industry
mix. Examples include the wage premium variable, the educational requirements variable,
and the variables measuring the share of MSA labor demand for the different demographic
groups. The calculation of these industry mix variables require data on employment by 2digit industries in the MSA for each year. But such 2-digit industry employment data are
frequently not available due to "data suppressions." For confidentiality reasons, federal
statistical agencies often will not release information for a particular 2-digit industry's
employment in a particular MSA and year.
I overcame these suppressions by estimating the employment in suppressed industries.
The procedure began by estimating suppressed 1-digit industries at the state level. The
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procedure then went on to estimate in turn suppressed 2-digit industries at the state level,
suppressed 1-digit industries at the MSA level, and suppressed 2-digit industries at the MSA
level.
At each stage, an outline of the procedure is as follows. Suppressed industry
employment numbers for a particular geographic unit (state or MSA) and year were initially
estimated where possible by interpolating or extrapolating from reported numbers for that
same industry and geographic unit for other years. If interpolation or extrapolation was
impossible because that industry was suppressed in that geographic unit for all years, then the
industry's employment number was estimated by using information on the industry's share of
employment in that year in the next higher geographic unit (i.e., the U.S. for a state, or the
state for an MSA). These initial estimates were then adjusted upwards or downwards so the
sum of industry numbers for that state or MSA added up to the next broader industrial
category. That is, the initial 2-digit estimates would be adjusted so that all 2-digit industry
employment numbers would add up to the appropriate 1-digit totals for that geographic unit;
the initial 1-digit numbers would be adjusted so that they added up to the all-industry total
for that geographic unit.
The initial estimates from interpolation, extrapolation, or higher level geographic units
were developed using industry share numbers. Interpolation assumed a constant linear
change in an industry's share of the next higher level industrial categories between the
observed years. Thus, if a 2-digit industry's share in a geographic unit of its 1-digit category
was .15 in 1985 and .17 in 1987, with 1986 suppressed, the initial estimates assumed a .16
share for the industry in 1986. Extrapolation assumed a constant industry share of the next
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highest industrial category from the nearest available year for that industry in that geographic
unit. Thus, if the last available year for a 2-digit industry had a share of .21 out of its 1digit category, I assumed that share would continue into the future. Alternatively, if the first
available year for a 2-digit industry had a share of .21, I assumed that its share was .21 in
previous years. Finally, if interpolation or extrapolation was not possible (because the
industry was suppressed for all years for that geographic unit), I assumed that the industry's
share of the next highest level industrial category was the same in the next highest level
geographic unit for which data were available. Thus, if a 2-digit industry was suppressed for
all years for an MS A, its share of the appropriate 1-digit total in that MS A was assumed to
be the same as the 2-digit share of the 1-digit total in the state in which the MS A was
primarily located.
I implemented this procedure using two different data bases. One data base was from
the Regional Economic Information System of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. This
data base provided 2-digit and 1-digit industry employment numbers for the nation and states,
and 1-digit numbers for MSAs, for all years from 1969 to 1989. These numbers are official
total full time and part time employment estimates prepared by BE A. The second data base
was "ES-202" data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This data base provided 2-digit
and 1-digit employment numbers for the nation, states, and MSAs, for all years from 1975 to
1989. These numbers are raw counts of the number of employees covered by unemployment
insurance. Both data bases use the same MSA definitions for all years, and the MSA
definitions are consistent between the 2 data bases.
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The REIS data are probably overall better because they are estimates, whereas the

ES-202 data simply provides raw counts of employees covered. The ES-202 data are not
adjusted for changes in unemployment insurance coverage or reporting, or any other factors
that might affect the accuracy of the numbers. On the other hand, the ES-202 data base is
unique in providing annual average information at the 2-digit level of detail for MSAs.
Because of these different strengths and weaknesses of the two data bases, the REIS
data were used to provide all estimates of 1-digit employment numbers at the MSA level.
The ES-202 data was used to provide estimates of the 2-digit shares of 1-digit totals at the
MSA level. These ES-202 derived 2-digit shares were then applied to the REIS-derived 1digit employment numbers to get 2-digit employment numbers.
The actual procedure went as follows. First, REIS suppressions were overcome at
the state level, for 1-digit industries. Second, REIS suppressions were overcome at the MSA
level for 1-digit industries. Third, ES-202 suppressions were overcome at the MSA level for
1-digit industries. 11 Fourth, ES-202 suppressions were overcome at the MSA level for 2digit industries. Fifth, the 2-digit shares of 1-digit numbers from steps 3 and 4 were applied
to the 1-digit numbers from step 2 to get 2-digit numbers at the MSA level.
Although estimating the suppressed industries was quite time-consuming, it is
important to note that most industries were not suppressed. For the average MS A/year
combination, about 15 of the 73 2-digit industries were suppressed. For the average MSA,
less than 3 of the 73 2-digit industries were suppressed for all years from 1975 to 1989.

11 If interpolation or extrapolation was impossible, and state 1-digit or 2-digit numbers
were suppressed for ES-202, national shares were used to obtain the initial estimates.
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Hence, the "industry mix" economic development variables mostly use real industry
employment numbers rather than estimated numbers. Furthermore, even in cases where
estimates were made, these estimates are likely to be fairly good. It is not implausible to
assume that interpolating or extrapolating industry share numbers from other years for the
MS A, or using industry share numbers from the state, will give reasonably accurate industry
share numbers for the MS A.

Decomposition of Causes of Shifts in Black High School Completer and Black High School
Dropout Labor Demand
Figures 5 and 6 in the main report show surprising trends in the percentage share of
labor demand for black high school dropouts and black high school completers. Figure 5
shows that black high school completer demand has declined over time. Figure 6 shows that
black high school dropout demand has increased over time.
The text discussion attributes these trends to various changes in the U.S. industrial
mix, and the particular industries in which black high school dropouts and completers are
concentrated. This subsection will back up the report's assertions with some data.
As defined in this report, the percentage of labor demand for black high school
dropout or completer demand as of some year r, for all MS As, can be expressed by the
following equation:
(T- 8)

Bt = (1/100)2 7^.
i

where Bt is the percentage of total MSA labor demand that we would expect to go to this
particular black group given the industry mix as of year t, BL is the percentage of
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employment in industry i that goes to that particular black group according to the 1990
Current Population Survey, and Pit is the percentage share of that industry i in total
employment for all MSAs as of year t. This variable is a prediction of the percentage of
demand for that black group if each industry in the U.S. employed the same percentage of
that group as it did in the 1990 CPS.
The change from year s to year t in this black labor demand variable can be
decomposed by the following formula:

(T.9)

Bt -Bs =

where B is the percentage share of employment in all industries that goes to the particular
black group being considered. The second equality in (T.9) follows because both Pit and P^
sum to 100 and B is a constant across all industries.
The decomposition in equation (T.9) is useful because it can be used to measure each
industry's "contribution" to the total change in labor demand for some black group. An
industry will make a positive contribution to increasing demand for a black group in either of
two cases: (1) the percentage share of total employment demand in that industry is
increasing (P,,-/^ is positive) and that black group has an above-average share of that
industry's employment (BrB is positive), or (2) the percentage share of total employment
demand in that industry is decreasing and that black group has a below-average share of that
industry's employment. Similarly, an industry will tend to be decreasing a black group's
labor demand in either of two cases: (1) it is a fast growth industry and that black group has
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a below-average share of that industry, or (2) it is a slow growth industry and that black
group has an above-average share of that industry.
Tables T6 and T7 show a few of the key industries that contribute to the observed
trends in black high school dropout and completer demand from 1979 to 1989. Table T6
shows that black high school dropout demand was significantly boosted by the relatively fast
employment growth in the eating and drinking place industry and the private household
services industry. Black high school dropouts had above-average shares of the employment
in these two fast-growth industries. Other industrial changes tended to decrease black
dropout labor demand, but not by enough to fully offset the effects of these two industries'
growth.
Table T7 shows that black high school completer demand was significantly reduced
by relatively slow growth in government employment (both military and civilian, federal and
state and local) and communications industry employment. Black high school completers had
above-average shares of the employment in these slow-growth industries. Other industrial
changes did tend to increase black completer labor demand, but not by enough to offset these
declines in government and government-regulated industries.

Table T6
Decomposition of Components of Change in Black High School
Drop-Outs Percentage Share of Labor Demand, 1979-89

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Difference of Black
High School Drop-Out
Percentage From All
Industry Average

Contribution of Industry
to Change in Black
Drop-Out Share

Industry

Change in Percentage
Industry's Share,
___1979-89
-4.05

4.20

-.0170

Food products
Eating & drinking places

.618

2.76

.0170

Private household
services

.129

12.38

.0160

All other industries
Total change in
percentage share of labor
demand

-.0073
.0087
(from 2.2492
to 2.2579%)

Notes: Column (2) is change in industry's percentage share of total employment, 1979 to 1989, for all MSAs.
Column (3) is percentage of industry's employees who are black high school dropouts minus similar percentage
for all industries.

Table T7
Decomposition of Components of Change in Black High School
Completers Percentage Share of Labor Demand, 1979-89

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Industry

Change in Percentage
Industry's Share,
1979-89

Difference of Black
High School Completer
Percentage From All
Industry Average

Contribution of Industry
to Change in Black
Completers Share
1(4)=[(3X2)1 • .01}

Federal civilian
employment

-.349

8.13

-.0284

Federal military
employment

-.178

8.90

-.0158

-1.111

3.09

-.0343

-.335

6.90

-.0231

State and local
government employment
Communications
All other industries
Total change in
percentage share of labor
demand, 1979-89

.0113
-.0903 (from
8.3173% to
8.2270%)

Notes: Column (2) is change in industry's percentage share of total employment, 1979 to 1989, for all MSAs.
Column (3) is percentage of industry's employees who are black high school completers minus similar
percentage for all industries.

